Beyond Kotter's *Leading Change*: A Broad Perspective on Organizational Change for Senior U.S. Military Leaders

Dr. Thomas P. Galvin[1], Ed.D. and LtCol Lance D. Clark, USAF

John Kotter's 1996 book *Leading Change*[2] is popular among U.S. Army War College students and with good reason. The book, and its subsequent editions, is well-written, easy to read, and appears simple to apply toward one of the more vexing challenges facing senior military leaders – how to transform a large, complex organization. His "eight-step model" provides a straightforward template for students to apply their experiences and develop initial diagnoses and potential solutions for any organization, all within the confines of a course paper or year-long research project. As both an introduction to theories of organizational change and a tool in the students' leadership kit bag, Kotter's *Leading Change* suits the foundational needs of students entering their future roles as senior leaders. For this reason, the book is used widely across the senior service colleges.[3]

Unfortunately, this has not necessarily improved the U.S. military's capabilities for implementing change.[4] As graduates leave senior service college and enter the military bureaucracy at senior levels, they often enter environments where Kotter's eight steps are difficult to apply and can even be counterproductive. Unless they have ready or routine access to the top leadership, they may not sense the ability to exercise the levels of influence or control over the situation that Kotter's model implies. Instead, the bureaucracy pushes back and pushes back hard.[5]

Unfortunately for new senior leaders, Kotter's model is insufficient to address many challenges specific to change efforts in the U.S. military. Written to cover a wide range of organizations, *Leading Change*'s concepts require further refinement to be operationalized in the military context. Below are three areas where such refinements are needed:

First, Kotter's eight-step model primarily covers *transformational* change – the well-defined, well-bounded effort in which a leader or *proponent[a]* determines the new end state and drives the organization toward that end state. Known as the *life-cycle* approach to change, it

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[a] This paper will use the term *proponent* to describe leaders and organizations leading or promoting a change effort, generally related to matters within their expertise, authorities, or interest. For example, a change related to human resource management is likely to have a '1' entity (Joint Staff J-1 or service G/A/N-1) as the proponent. The leaders and project officers within that proponent vested in pursuing the change effort will be referred to as *change agents.*

constitutes the simplest narrative to describe how change occurs. It takes a perspective that the organization should operate as a unified whole as it moves from the current state to a desired future state, with the change effort fully planned and intensely managed. However, this is not the only way change occurs in a functionally diverse and geographically distributed organization like the U.S. military. Sometimes it is 'bottom-up' whereby localized change efforts occur independently with the best ideas or best practices permeating the organization. Military writers have long called for the adoption of a culture of innovation to encourage such bottom-up behaviors.[6]

Second, Kotter's model requires creating a sense of urgency (his model's first step, expounded upon in separate works[7]) and treats resistance as obstacles to be overcome or suppressed.[8] Military officers attending senior service college may find such views attractive as they appear consistent with the military culture of authority associated with being a unit commander (whether brigade, battalion, ship, or squadron). Urgency and resistance, however, take many forms, especially in extremely large and complex organizations such as the U.S. military. Sometimes driving change from the top in Kotter's prescribed manner can actually undermine the change effort and feed resistance. Far-flung units and commands are not likely to grasp the same sense of urgency as the proponent, and communicating the vision (Kotter's step six) may not work. More experienced (but geographically distant) members of the organization may see the communications as artificial, inauthentic, or even offensive. The authors' experiences suggest strategic patience has an important role in enacting change. Choosing the right moment to pursue a change effort can influence the outcome even more than adding vigor,[9] but determining that right moment is difficult.

A third reason is the U.S. military has hundreds, if not thousands, of change efforts simultaneously underway. Every new weapon systems program, organizational realignment, headquarters consolidation, gain or drop in end strength, and other activity undertaken by the defense enterprise constitutes an organizational change effort. Even at the 4-star level, senior leaders are working to initiate transformational change amidst a turbulent sea of on-going change. Although the organization desires a harmonious path toward a central vision (e.g., *Joint Vision 2020* or the Army's *Force 2025 and Beyond*), these multiple change efforts all compete for a finite amount of resources and attention. This challenge is exacerbated by the evolutionary nature of each change effort, which frequently adjusts to keep pace with the continual changes in national security environment and military requirements.

Thus, *Leading Change* is an important first step in understanding change in U.S. military, but only a first step. To ultimately be effective as change agents, senior leaders should go beyond Kotter's eight-step model and understand other ways that change occurs in the U.S. defense enterprise and other massive organizations.

This primer offers a glimpse of the bigger picture. It begins with two sections that discuss the overall problem, beginning with Section A on the context ("Understanding the U.S. Military

as an Organization"). It presents the unique aspects of massive, million-plus-person-sized global organizations that must be considered when pursuing change efforts. This is followed by Section B ("Some Military-Specific Challenges with Change"), which examines the meanings of success and failure in military change efforts which illustrate why Kotter's approach often does not represent a complete solution.

The next two sections present a broad base of change literature. Section C ("Motors and Modes to Change") presents alternative forms of change from the fields of organizational studies and organizational development, and gives examples of how they occur within the military. This will serve to expand the aperture from the top-down transformational method of Kotter to bottom-up and middle-out forms of change. Section D ("Diagnosing the Organization") presents more advanced and systematic notions of identifying problems in an organization from which to initiate change.

Section E ("Crafting the Change Effort") constitutes the meat of this paper. For change efforts in the military, this section offers ideas on how to formulate the change vision, craft its associated strategies and plan, and govern the implementation.

The final two sections present important considerations for change agents. Section F ("Resistance and the Bigger Problem of Ambivalence") discusses the various forms resistance can take and suggests that ambivalence, the state of conflicted feelings about a change effort, is the greater problem in massive distributed organizations such as the U.S. military. How can leaders deal with these problems beyond merely treating them as obstacles? Finally, Section G ("Swimming in a Sea of Change") addresses the challenge of inheriting and sustaining change efforts, and deciding whether they need to continue, follow a new path, or stop.

A. Understanding the U.S. Military as an Organization

Some leaders espouse a view that the U.S. military is not like a corporation, often specifying the lack of profit motive, and therefore militaries can only gain limited benefit in considering how the private sector operates. Nothing could be further than the truth. If one views the defense enterprise as a large, complex organization that provides a vital service to society, the very acts of developing capabilities and performing those services (described here as providing combat-ready forces to combatant commanders) differ mainly in context and not in nature. On the contrary, failure to understand how the defense enterprise synthesizes three forms of economic behavior – those of a firm, a government entity, and a profession – constrains senior leaders' abilities to support the enterprise's mission while simultaneously serving as stewards of taxpayer resources. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the key terms in microeconomics and management that help explain these behaviors as demonstrated by historical example.

A.1. The U.S. Military as a Public Sector Professional Enterprise

In the management literature, the terms *business*, *enterprise*, and *firm* tend to be synonymous. Because *business* tends to be associated with private sector activities and *firm* often associated with specific professions such as law, this primer will thus refer to the U.S. military as an *enterprise*. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines an enterprise as both "a unit of economic organization or activity" and "a systematically purposeful activity,"[10] the combination of which serves well to describe both the processes and products of the U.S. military. It is an economic organization in that the military expends significant resources generating and sustaining the capabilities and capacities needed for its mission, and engages with the private sector (e.g., the *defense industrial base*) to do so. Its systematically purposeful activity is clearly to provide for the national defense.

Since enterprises can be either public or private sector (the primary difference is ownership), we can define the U.S. military as a *public sector enterprise* responsible for providing defense (service) of the nation (client). The public exercises ownership by channeling public resources (e.g., taxes) to the military. It is here where the frequently-cited lack of profit motive comes into play since clients predominantly assess government agency performance on the quality and timely delivery of the service.

Furthermore, the U.S. military is a *professional* organization that provides defense in accordance with professional norms. This includes qualities of self-governance, custodianship of subject matter expertise in military matters, and a trusted relationship with the public.[11] Professions also do not follow the profit-motive model, although individual professionals in the private sector might. Instead, professions earn their assessments similar to government agencies, by their effectiveness in delivering *professional* services.

The professional and public sector characteristics of the U.S. military often complement each other. Lacking the profit motive, the military will prefer activities that increase effectiveness at the risk (to a point) of inefficiency.[12] The creation of the Overseas Contingency Operations funding stream is an example. When the client (represented by Congress) deems the service of defense to be inadequate, the client provides more money for the purposes of securing higher levels of that service. Of course, the inverse can be a source of conflict if the client does not grant sufficient resources to the military, which means the latter cannot effectively provide the expected levels of desired service. Because effectiveness and efficiency of providing such services are hard to measure quantitatively, even in wartime, it is extremely difficult to determine how many resources are precisely enough to protect the nation.

This leads to another vitally important function of the U.S. military: Stewardship. The military seeks to optimize use of its resources, prudently leveraging the assets its clients have entrusted to it by eliminating (or at least minimizing) fraud, waste, and abuse. Congress and the executive branch demand full accountability and transparency from the enterprise's top leaders.

Demonstrating such accountability requires senior leaders to satisfy legal requirements, such as producing mandated reports, making routine formal statements, and testifying before Congress. In practice, it also includes leadership actions to improve efficiency. Redundancy, for example, is normally discouraged, and many stakeholders regard reducing redundancy as a minimum requirement to exercising good stewardship. Yet, this presents to the joint force and the services with a significant challenge – posturing a U.S. military with right balance of capacities and capabilities across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains to provide defense of the nation without any redundancy and without exploitable gaps.

A.2. The U.S. Military as a "Very Large" Organization

The scope and size of the U.S. military warrants special attention. Service end strengths easily exceeding one million men and women, combining active duty and reserve components; including civilians, contractors, family members, defense industrial partners, etc., makes it readily apparent how large and complex the defense enterprise is. Turcotte describes *very large* organizations as follows:

> [A] multifunctional organization with at least five hierarchical levels and a very complex external environment from which resources and directions flow. In such an organization, the range of top management responsibilities allows only infrequent, though often intense, interactions with most subordinates. Opportunities for personal direction and role-centered leadership patterns are limited. Range and complexity of organizational issues make it difficult for executives to master the details involved. They must instead develop skill in abstracting the essence, implication, and key ideas from complex issues.[13]

However, the real meaning of 'large' or 'very large,' whether in terms of on-hand assets or numbers of personnel, depends greatly on the industry.[14] Relating the U.S. defense enterprise's size is therefore relative to comparable organizations (e.g., other government agencies or other militaries). Pleshko and Nickerson (2007) show that as an organization grows, so too does its formalization, integration, centralization, and complexity. They further observe that even if an organization does not change in size, its natural tendency is to grow more formal, centralized, and complex; that is, to become naturally more bureaucratic.[15]

Turcotte summarizes the challenges for leaders at the top levels of very large organizations as follows: (1) being unable to rely on past experience, (2) agenda being "dominated by external events," (3) an inability to "get their arms around the organization," and (4) extremely limited time available to deal with internal matters which risks leading to conflicted policies and priorities.[16] He also notes change strategies that work well for smaller organizations may not necessarily work in very large ones, a finding supported by various studies in change.[17]

Very large organizations are complex and adaptive, but they tend to adapt naturally toward a more stable, structured form that risks becoming hardened, bureaucratic, and unable to

innovate or adapt. In his later book *Accelerate*, Kotter described this as a natural part of the life-cycle of an organization as it slowly adopts successful habits and practices into its culture. This moves the organization from a more dynamic network-based culture to one of managed hierarchy. Although Kotter notes managed hierarchies are necessary in very large organizations to allow routine necessary actions to remain routine in implementation, the strategic agility inherent in the networked approach is vitally important.[18] The U.S. Army's recent adoption of the Mission Command philosophy is a step in that direction, emphasizing how subunits should be trusted to make proper, autonomous decisions to achieve the commander's intent.[19] From an organizational change standpoint, Mission Command encourages localized, independent pursuit of innovative solutions to complement the pursuit of the higher headquarters commander's vision.

Herein lies the challenge for U.S. military leaders – melding the hierarchical and bureaucratic character of a very large public sector organization exercising stewardship, with a professional character emphasizing innovative solutions from within to continuously improve the military's ability to provide for the national defense. For proponents, these two characters can often clash, and the professional character loses out in the face of pressures to conform to whole-enterprise transformational solutions.

B. Some Military-Specific Challenges with Change

Many senior leaders can relate to the challenges with change Kotter illustrates in the first chapter, titled "Transforming Organizations: Why Firms Fail." The eight errors probably sound as familiar to leaders in the military and other public sector organizations as they do to those in the corporate world. Some of us have probably encountered "Conrad" the quality expert who overplanned a transformation effort but never communicated the compelling reason for it, or "Ralph," the foolhardy executive who single-handedly blocked everything the organization tried to do.[20]

However, change within the U.S. military brings with it certain environmental and cultural challenges stemming both internally and externally. These challenges may mirror the eight errors in Kotter. However, they are rarely so easily correctable or avoidable. Hence, proponents must consider them when undertaking any change effort.

B.1. Fear of "breaking" the organization to fix it

Consider construction of a new highway. Since no one was using it, construction can proceed so long as land is available. Now, consider improving the same highway after years of use (widening, repaving, repairing, etc.). This time the change is a disruption, and the process must allow for continued use of the highway at reduced levels of capacity. It will inconvenience drivers, close exits, reroute traffic, increase law enforcement presence, and require vigorous adherence to safety regulations. What's more, improvement can likely only occur over a 5 to 10 mile (8 to 16 km) segment at a time, thereby requiring multiple phases and prolonging the

disruption for years or decades. Construction was simple, straightforward, and quick. Improvement is complex, highly involved, and takes much longer.

Change in a large organization can feel the same way, even when leaders follow all of Kotter's steps. No matter how many "Pardon our dust while we improve your service" signs an organization displays, change is inconvenient and brings about uneasiness and discomfort.[21] Organizations must continuously improve while still competing in their particular markets. The U.S. military is no exception; after all, it provides for our national security, a vital professional service on which the nation relies. This allows little room for error and constrains the appetite for introducing new capabilities if it means reducing readiness or accepting significant risk.

As a government organization, the U.S. military has the additional responsibility to act as good stewards of taxpayer dollars. Reducing redundancy, along with the required administration and reporting associated with government work, can cause organizations to hold core operations sacred and allow less wiggle room for experimentation or innovation. Particularly for subunits that perform vital services or are subject to strict timelines or other external constraints, there is typically less interest in putting today's marginally-effective processes at risk in favor of pursuing the uncertain promise of a better way. Consider the anxiety often experienced when 'new' information technology solutions emerged to automate paper-based processes and make them more efficient, only to require extensive workarounds when the system failed to account for all the informal ways that members actually employed the process. This means proposals for change must thoroughly explore and carefully weigh all opportunities and risks.

B.2. Pursuing efficiencies but ignoring hidden costs

People seem to naturally presume very large organizations are inherently too large, giving rise to debates like: What is the difference between an organization with two-million people and one with one-million-nine-hundred-thousand? Why fifty installations when forty-five might do? In an environment of performance driven by numbers, lowering the numbers is always attractive, especially if there is the promise of 'savings' to reinvest in 'other priorities.'

Leaders often promote *efficiency* as a reason to change. At the strategic level, seeking efficiency generally leads to some form of centralization, under the presumption that consolidating a capability reduces the overall expenditure in providing that capability. However, efficiency is a term easily misused as it is a matter of perspective. For example, consolidating the provision of a common service at a central location (e.g. information technology help desks) may allow similar levels of customer responsiveness while permitting reduction in manpower, but the local effects of the consolidation may include reduced productivity or lost time that is unaccounted for in the business case analysis. Such effects incur costs hidden from the decision maker, whose primary concern is reducing the tangible cost of funding the capability. This can breed frustration and cynicism among mid-level leaders within the organization who perceive the change as neither efficient nor effective.

Moreover, even invoking efficiency as a reason risks engendering defensive responses in the U.S. military. As a profession, the military considers effectiveness to be paramount, with efficiency as a lesser concern (while still valuing the importance of stewardship and minimizing waste).[22] This leads to internal strife over certain change efforts whereby financial managers see risk in busted budgets and program cost overruns, while the operations community sees risk in readiness levels, deterrence posture, and service members' lives. Both represent categories of hidden costs that are very difficult to estimate, let alone quantify in detail.

B.3. Programmed change overwhelming innovation

The U.S. military manages its resources and organizational energy through programs. Organizational leaders sometimes designate specific programs as *programs of record,* introducing two dynamics that can inhibit innovation. The first surrounds the strong sense of importance that programs of record earn as a result of organizational leaders conferring such a title in a stereotypically top-down fashion. Efforts not supporting those programs organizational leaders have advocated are often dismissed, unsupported, or undercut. The second surrounds the access to assured resources programs of record gain. Its rigorous budget process causes the US military to program the overwhelming majority of its resources, leaving relatively few resources available for more discretionary, experimental purposes. Although the US military does not need to program all change efforts in this way, military leaders must approve expending resources to support almost any change effort. This potentially squelches interest in pursuing bottom-up innovations,[23] an ironic dynamic since Kotter's (1996) fifth step -- empowerment for broad-based action – is an important part of traditional U.S. military culture.

A similar problem surrounds another commonly-used tool, the 'best practice.' By their nature, best practices showcase a more effective or efficient way of doing a task as pioneered by a subunit or staff. This new way may or may not be generalizable, but senior leaders hungry for innovative solutions often latch onto a best practice and promote it as an enterprise-wide solution before it has demonstrated long-term benefits or been considered for applicability in other contexts. As 'best practices' emerge, they can be shared and either adopted or adapted across the force. But, once a 'best practice' becomes a declared standard or program of record, it ceases its innovative influences and takes on a programmed character. Done too hastily, organizations risk losing the important local context that gave rise to the best practice, instead implementing the idea in less suitable conditions which risks failure (or lessened success).

B.4. Initiating change as a perceived result of an external stakeholder issue

There is little getting around the fact that some changes are imposed upon the U.S. military from outside.[24] Congress is one stakeholder that imposes itself coercively on the military. In response to something the military did or failed to do, Congress has numerous means at its disposal to forcibly bring about change: (1) funding or not funding something the services requested, (2) legislating requirements for additional reporting or conducting 'studies', (3)

expressing grievances publicly through the media or through hearings, including calling senior leaders to testify, and (4) holding up confirmations or promotion lists.

Another key stakeholder is the American public. Army doctrine establishes this vital relationship well and it applies to all services, "Trust underwrites our relationship to the Nation and the citizens we protect. Without the confidence of the citizens, we could not maintain the All-Volunteer Force."[25] An important manifestation is a harmonizing of societal norms with the military. When military norms differ substantially with social norms, the potential for society to lose trust in the military increases, as evidenced how changes in societal attitudes toward homosexuality pushed the military towards their integration.[26]

Whether it is Congressional action, news reports, or another media, the source of a complaint against the U.S. military is likely to be widely known. Any change effort initiated, renewed, or otherwise appearing connected to that external impetus may spur natural resistance from within the military rank and file unless leaders demonstrate full ownership. Service members and civilians are more willing to pursue a change created and endorsed by its leaders, and more likely to distrust ones where leaders appear to be reacting to events or placating stakeholders.

The challenge for leaders, particularly in times of crisis, is to balance external stakeholder demands or expectations with enacting necessary change in the organization's best interest. For a given crisis, a sufficient internal response may involve training or education to reinforce existing values, norms, or procedures. However, the nature or severity of the crisis may require some form of public action, such as the punishment or removal of certain officials, while new procedures and reporting requirements are imposed, even if they would be unnecessarily disruptive.

Resistance or ambivalence toward such externally-driven changes is a challenge for leaders. Leader reluctance to change is hard to hide.[27] Remote subunits will have difficulty understanding the impetus if the impact of the external event only reaches the Pentagon. Leaders should restate or alter the context to place themselves as change agents and wrest the initiative from the external stakeholder. This increases, but does not guarantee, the chance of the organization understanding and accepting a change effort.

B.5. Leading Change Efforts is (Unfortunately) Not a Core Competency

Organizational change scholar Frank Ostroff compared transformative change efforts between the private and public sectors and found that an obstacle that government organizations inherently face is that its people tend to be selected and promoted more for their mastery of standing policies and their technical expertise, and not because of prior experience in leading change efforts.[28] This is certainly true in the military, where the majority of junior leaders focus on enforcing existing policies and regulations and operating within established doctrine. When these leaders take initiative and bring about changes, they tend to be evolutionary, small-scale, localized, or temporary.

It is not until reaching senior levels of leadership that leading change becomes a required component of joint professional military education.[29]

It is ironic that military leaders often want transformational change, invoking innovative ideas and activities in the private sector that the military ought to adopt. Some military leaders and scholars have proposed adopting Google's business culture that includes employees fencing twenty percent of their time to spend on individual innovative pursuits that are separate from one's duties, and systematically rewarding failure (i.e., unsuccessful attempts at innovation).[30]

C. Motors and Modes of Change

Kotter's eight-step model serves as a one-for-one fix for the eight errors he identifies among change efforts in general. The above challenges, however, require a broader and deeper understanding of change as a phenomenon within organizations, of which planned or programmed change is but one type. For example, leaders can encourage organizations to innovate (and Kotter does encourage it), but innovation under the constraints and conditions facing military leaders takes more than simple calls for empowerment. It requires a wholly different way of thinking about how change occurs.

This section describes other aspects of change occurring in organizations as suggested by various scholars. Some forms as deliberately planned, others less so. Some fit within military culture readily, others not so obviously. But all are present and active to some degree within the U.S. military. To gain a broader understanding of change overall, we'll first compare Kotter's eight-step process with other conceptions of organizational change.

C.1. Change in 'Three Stages' – From Lewin (1951) to Bridges (1991)

As American philosopher Eric Hoffer observed, change is highly unsettling, even when recognized as necessary.[31] Thus, even when a U.S. military change effort is widely accepted and embraced, the organization still undergoes an uncomfortable and uncertain transition toward the new normal; this often involves a reluctance to let go of the old ways, regardless of how poor or ineffective they were.

The change management literature has produced numerous models for planning and implementing organizational change through the years. Many of them share one thing in common – the notion that a planned change effort has three stages.[32] While the stages may differ slightly in definition and meaning, they all distinguish the departure from the current organizational state from the acceptance of a new state, while describing an unsettling or uncertain liminal stage in between where the bulk of the change actually occurs. This subsection chooses two such models as they represent two vastly different ways of thinking about change, both of which influenced Kotter's eight-step model. The first is Lewin's (1951) three-phased

approach of *unfreezing, moving,* and *refreezing*, which takes a more physical or tangible perspective. The second covers cultural or emotional manifestations of change, exemplified by Bridges' (1991) three stages of transitions of *letting go, the neutral zone,* and *launching a new beginning*. Lewin's and Bridges' works overlap significantly, although it was Bridges who offered the notion that *change* and *transitions* were two distinct concepts.

C.1.1. Lewin's Unfreezing, Moving, and Refreezing

Lewin's (1951) conception of change is still quite popular today; his three phases – *unfreezing, moving, and refreezing*[33] – still persist as the fundamental basis for planned change efforts, and is readily mappable to Kotter's eight-step approach. Figure 1 depicts these three stages. First, leaders must jolt the organization out of its complacency. Kotter's first four steps seek to accomplish this by clearly demonstrating the *status quo* is unacceptable to establish a sense of urgency, and then leveraging a guiding coalition, vision and strategy, and a communications plan to imbue urgency across the organization. Lewin included both *driving* and *restraining* forces that acted upon the organization in the present state, while more recent authors tend to associate these forces as present through the change (for example, restraining forces during refreezing seek to undo the change and restore the old state).


Figure 1. Lewin's (1951) concept of planned organizational change[34]

Lewin's second phase is *moving*, actually undergoing the change. This equates to Kotter's steps five through seven, incorporating a climate that fosters change, building momentum through short term wins and consolidating gains. Of course, as *Leading Change* is a general purpose guide and exercising these steps are very context-dependent, Kotter devotes minimal attention to the details of how this can best occur in a given organization.

Lewin's final phase, *refreezing*, is Kotter's final step of anchoring new approaches. This is where the change becomes permanent and the organization attempts to resist returning to the old ways.

C.1.2. Bridges' Transitions

Bridges differentiates *change* from *transition,* defining the latter as a psychological phenomenon with a multi-phase "process that people go through as they internalize and come to terms with the details of the new situation [that] change brings about."[35] That is, change causes a transition to take place. Whereas Lewin depicted changes as a sequence of three phases, Bridges' depicts the three phases of transitions as partially overlapping and highly variable between and within individuals (see Figure 2).

The first phase which dominates the early part of the transition is named *Ending, Losing, Letting Go* (hereafter simplified as 'letting go'). It represents the condition of stopping doing something that is familiar. In contrast to Lewin's unfreezing, which orients on the potential for the new, this represents the disorientation associated with ceasing the old way. Often in the U.S. military, letting go can be very difficult especially when combat success forged the old ways of doing business. The cliché "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" comes to mind. Bridges suggests organizational members need to be able to grieve, openly acknowledging the discomfort and thereby dealing with it.


Figure 2. Bridges' (1991) concept of transitions associated with change[36]

Bridges calls his second phase *The Neutral Zone.* Whereas in Lewin's second phase, the new way simply supplants the old way; Bridges sees this phase as an emotional "no-man's land,"[37] marked with high anxiety. "This isn't a trip from one side of the street to the other. It's a journey from one identity to the other, and that takes time."[38] The challenge for proponents is to stay the course and guide the organization through the neutral zone by clearly defining the new normal and promoting creative solutions to problems arising from the change effort.

Bridges' third phase is *The New Beginning* (also called "Launching the New Beginning"). As suggested in Figure 2, this phase occurs concurrently with the previous two phases, but should increase in emphasis over time. Bridges emphasizes that fearing the new is separate and distinct from letting go of the old. Individuals may have little difficulty with getting rid of a process that doesn't work, but can still be anxious over the new, unproven system. Others might not have

sufficiently let go of the old, and thereby overreact to minor problems or inconveniences encountered when exercising the new system.

As with Lewin, Bridges' advice meshes well with Kotter's eight steps, save one important and fundamental difference; Bridges goes into more detail about how an organization *copes* with change, and not always beneficially. Given that the many large-scale change efforts in the U.S. military are complex and involve units and organizations distributed globally, coping activities may be invisible to the proponent (or worse, ignored). Improper attention to coping can derail a change effort, especially when the organization ultimately refuses to let go of the old ways of doing business despite the admonitions of senior leaders. Section F will further explore coping, specifically the dynamics of resistance and ambivalence.

C.2. Motors of Change – Van de Ven and Poole (1995)

In a 1995 review analyzing numerous theories of change, scholars Van de Ven and Poole noted Lewin's concept was but one of many, and different forms of purposeful change could occur in an organization simultaneously. Rather than approaches, they referred to these forms as *motors* that differed according to the scope and nature of change processes employed.[39]

Figure 3 shows the four motors of change arranged on a 2x2 grid. The Y-axis differentiates the breadth (unit) of change:[40]

- *Single-entity* - views the organization as a unitary whole and therefore exercises more of a top-down approach. Kotter's *Leading Change* primarily addresses the single-entity perspective.
  - o For the U.S. military, this view demonstrates itself in change efforts at the joint level mandating service compliance and the creation of defense-level agencies that centralize particular functions. U.S. military change efforts in this view are common among support functions from communications (the Global Information Grid under the Defense Information Systems Agency) to medical (creation of the Defense Health Agency) and financial management (institution of the Defense Finance and Accounting System).
  - o At the service level, this view sees the service as a whole and all subcommunities fall in line. The Army Transformation from the late 1990s is an example, as it sought to change the way the entire Army fought and sustained itself, including the concept of a common chassis to reduce the complexity of the logistics tail.
- *Multiple-entity* – characterized by more than one change effort, possibly seeking identical outcomes. Typically this means different parts of the organization are working change efforts simultaneously and independently. Examples in the U.S. military tend to be the inverse of the single-entity cases described above.
  - o From a joint level, multiple-entity change occurs when services pursue service-specific solutions to problems faced across the joint community.

For example, each service has its own aviation programs to support service (and joint) requirements. Sometimes the programs overlap in the resultant capabilities (redundancy), which may bring about the need to forge a single joint solution (single-entity); in many cases however, the differences in requirements take precedence and the services retain their unique efforts.

o Within the services, there are subcommunities whose unique requirements inhibit or preclude suitable service-wide solutions. A common example is the divide between general-purpose and special forces, whereby the latter pursues capabilities distinct from the former due to highly specialized requirements. This perspective is different from (and does not conflict with) recent doctrine calling for more integration of conventional and special forces to meet current and future requirements, none of which suggests that these forces must be combined into one with a single array of capabilities.[41]


Figure 3. Van de Ven and Poole's four motors of change (reference to Kotter added)[42]

The X-axis discusses mode of change:

- *Prescribed* - leaders predetermine the sequencing of events and goals of the change effort. They view stability and predictability of the change outcomes as important, as see coordinating and synthesizing outcomes along lines of effort as critical to ensure achievement of the overall objectives at the end.
- *Constructive* - leaders do not necessarily know the actions and outcomes of the change in advance. The impetus (*status quo* unacceptable) is sufficient to drive the quest to find alternatives, which may produce novel ideas or generate useful experimentation.

Although one may associate constructive change as 'bottom-up,' the terms are not identical; in fact bottom-up change can occur as a result of any of the four motors. The life-cycle motor, which Kotter most closely associates, is largely associated with top-down driven or 'transformational' change.

C.2.1. Life Cycle Motor

The *life-cycle* motor is the simplest of the four. It has clearly defined start and endpoints, and the organization (or a clearly definable and independent part of it) pursues the goals *in toto.* Van de Ven and Poole used a farming metaphor, whereby the organization sets out the vision and detailed plan at the start and implements it, the changes occur across the organization, and then the benefits are 'harvested' as permanent changes in culture, structure, and/or processes. Of note, this motor's end point may not be a true end. Organizations may only partially achieve their goals, or the environment demands changes of direction; hence the loop back to the start.

Named change efforts, such as the Army Transformation or procurement of any major weapons system, most often exercise this motor of change as it facilitates the programming and budgetary process in the U.S. This is because the military organization (whether joint or service) does not have the disposable assets to pursue the change effort and must therefore petition Congress for resources. It does this by preparing a thorough program with goals and milestones expressed through annual budgets, such that programmers can adjust should Congress allocate the resources differently. Life-cycle changes can also engender the necessary structures and processes to track and report progress. For weapon systems, a minted 'program of record' falls under a project office with assigned manning to oversee development, acquisition, fielding, and sustainment. Similarly, DoD and its services centrally manage other change efforts (like Army Transformation) under a designated proponent.

C.2.2. Evolutionary Motor

Moving clockwise in Figure 3, the *evolutionary* motor combines the prescribed mode of change among multiple entities. This is a redundant form of change – whereby organizations pursue a set of goals in multiple ways, harnessing so-called best practices and abandoning others. It is a simple concept to apply in the private sector, where new businesses crop up to leverage some new technology, only a few of them survive in the competitive marketplace, and then the

survivors adjust in the retention phase according to the environment. The cycle renews as new competitors enter the picture. Key for this motor is understanding that each of the prescribed change initiatives only affect a portion of the organization.

Within the defense enterprise, the evolutionary motor operates slightly differently; 'losers' in the selection process do not necessarily disappear, but are more likely absorbed or co-opted. An example of this lies in the support functions, such as communications and logistics, which often emerge as service-specific solutions to warfighting requirements (and sometimes break down further to separate conventional and special forces solutions). These semi-independent initiatives exercise their own acquisitions and procedures. However, over time 'best practices' typically emerge from one or a few initiatives, spread throughout the joint force and become the new norm. Another example is when DoD imposes a standard solution (such as a joint agency taking over broad responsibility for the function).

C.2.3. Dialectic Motor

The *dialectic* motor operates in the opposite fashion from the traditional top-down life-cycle motor – multiple-entities in a constructive mode. Internal controversy fuels the dialectic motor, whereby two (or more) views of how to accomplish things are in continuous conflict, creating conditions by which the organization evolves through the synthesis of the conflict. Synthesis could be a negotiated compromise or one side winning, but in either case it is only temporary if the controversy remains unsolved.

There are many such conflicts within the U.S. military, which do not necessarily fall across sub-organizational lines. For example, the question of whether to prioritize either conventional or unconventional (e.g., counterinsurgency) forces pits traditional combat arms against Special Forces. Yet, individuals within those communities hold their own views on what constitutes a proper balance. A typical approach to synthesis is training general purpose forces in certain special operations skills; this proves difficult because the training demands of conventional forces are already significant. Thus, the dialectic is rarely resolved.

As a constructive motor, this is a difficult form of change around which to plan. In times when the conflict is muted, meaning each side can pursue its own goals independently, then an organization essentially has multiple life-cycle change efforts running simultaneously among separate communities. It is when conflict springs due to environmental factors (e.g., global crises, state of overseas operations) and stakeholder concerns (e.g., fate of on-going programs and budget constraints) that this motor activates and the sides square off. While leaders may attempt to impose a top-down compromise or choose sides, this is more likely to only tilt the balance in the short term and not permanently resolve the controversy. It is very difficult to predict the outcome of synthesis in advance.

C.2.4. Teleological Motor

The *teleological* motor best describes the traditional notion of the 'bottom-up' change. In this case, the organization keeps a unitary perspective with one aim, but allows change efforts to emerge and proliferate on their own with less direction from above. It involves a centralized vision or intent, but fully decentralized planning and execution. In essence, organizations allow subunits to tailor change activities to their local situations. The teleological cycle depicted in Figure 3 looks similar to the life-cycle, but the behavior differs. A segment of the organization perceives *dissatisfaction* with the current state being different than the desired state, and thus sets about a plan to close or eliminate the gap. Once complete or at a decisive point, the organization reassesses the gap between current and desired states, and new actions ensue. Thus, across the entire force, a single central goal may spawn hundreds of localized solutions, each inching toward a target.

C.2.5. Combining Motors

It is important to acknowledge that one or more of Van de Ven and Poole's motors can combine to drive change.[43] One can imagine how the teleological and evolutionary motors can work together when considering efforts to resolve a complex problem requiring localized solutions, with the best practices emerging and consolidating efforts toward an emergent enterprise-level effort. Or, the dialectic and life-cycle motors working simultaneously as competing, possibly mutually exclusive, visions (e.g., convention vs. COIN) spawn independent but comprehensive and discrete life-cycle based change efforts, which might see limited overlap. As a force, the competing vision still synthesizes toward satisfaction of the national security strategy or budget proposal. The Department of Defense and the services exercise all four motors in the aggregate across the hundreds of on-going change efforts.

C.3. Strategies of Change – Chin and Benne (1989)

Looking at the strategies of change is the third way to expand upon Kotter's tenets. These strategies are the methods leaders use to engage with followers to make change happen. As with Van de Ven and Poole, Chin and Benne (1989) conducted a historical analysis of change strategies studied during the previous century and narrowed them down to three classes: *rational-empirical*, *normative-reeducative,* and *power-coercive*.[44] Notably, the authors did not exercise value judgments as to which is better, but observed any change effort can exercise any strategy beneficially or harmfully.

C.3.1. Rational-Empirical Strategies

According to Chin and Benne, the rational-empirical strategy is most common in America and Western Europe. This strategy stems from the Enlightenment and Classic Liberalism, which assumes people are rational actors who will tend to follow rational self-interests. It views change as purposeful to achieve "a situation that is desirable, effective, and in line with the self-interest of the person [or collective]."[45]

While rational-empirical labels a single category, the two terms represent different manifestations, with 'rational' referring to qualifiable logics, and empirical to the quantifiable. In short, these are changes driven through data. One of the earlier theories in this category was "Taylorism" or *scientific management*,[46] an effort to use incentives to change assembly line behaviors (measured quantitatively in terms of individual capability and capacity) and improve productivity. Although this particular strategy is often reviled due to its impersonal consideration of workers, remnants of Taylorism remain today in efforts to increase throughput in making products or providing services. Another category is in *psychometrics* and *sociometrics*, past efforts to measures aptitudes and attitudes of individuals as means of managing personnel. As tools of organizational change, these strategies called for replacing organizational members with those deemed better fit for a particular job description, or moving personnel around the organization to more productive locations based on their specific talents. These too are no longer used, but organizations take similar approaches under the guise of talent management and other personnel strategies.

The primary strategy in this category still widely used is *operations research and systems analysis,* or ORSA. ORSA provides detailed mathematical evidence to analyze the environment and identify both the need for change (sense of urgency) and the decision support tools to enable planning and implementation of change efforts. The defense enterprise widely employs ORSA tools, from the DOD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system to service specific force management analysis processes, to Combatant Command capability requirement models.

Although data-driven change efforts can be well-informed, and progress readily measurable, such strategies are not without detractors. In particular, change efforts driven by 'the numbers' can seem inflexible and impersonal. They rely on accurate and valid data entry and analysis, meaning the numbers sufficiently and correctly represent the statuses of the organization, change efforts, and the overall environment such that the achievement of the 'right numbers' equates to achievement of the change goals or vision. This requires accurate data, and valid models that wholly reflect the subject of the model, lest the change effort produce unintended results or unwanted second-order effects.

C.3.2. Normative-Reeducative Strategies

Normative-reeducative change reflects two very similar strategies which guide the organization toward the goal. While assuming individuals are still rational and intelligent, these strategies place more credence on sociocultural norms and value systems as motivators of change. In effect, change involves altering one's personal norms – knowledge and habits – along with attitudes, skills, and relationships. Normative (therapy) and reeducative (training) actually constitute two slightly different approaches toward instituting these norms. In practice, these strategies often involve the use of internal or external consultants who encourage and foster change efforts both individually and organizationally.[47]

Normative, or therapeutic, strategies tend to take the view that the change effort must address a matter of human relationships or morale within the organization. Consultants are thus oriented on diagnosing the root causes of a problem and encouraging members to adopt a new outlook. *T Groups* were one such strategy, where groups of organizational members sought to identify and address problems through facilitated dialogue. A more modern and current variety is *action research*, which adds reflection and communities of practice to systematize research and solution development as social activities. One could ascribe the military's integration of homosexuals as having used a normative strategy, whereby the force adopted a new normal after recognizing shifting values in society and among service members themselves.

Re-educative, or training, strategies differ in that they address problems with completing tasks or other more technical aspects of the organization's functioning. Whereas therapy (normative) may address matters of culture, re-education focuses more on process -- how to do things better. Improvement is a matter of training within the organization to ensure the appropriate individuals understand the solutions (new processes). Many changes involving human resource management, such as performance appraisals (e.g., the Army's Officer Efficiency Reporting System), invoke this type of strategy in which organizations undertake a combination of training and counseling to guide members to new ways of doing business.

Although these strategies address the impersonal shortcomings of the rational-empirical strategies, they can also create havoc if used improperly. They require willing organizations that desire the intended results. A normative strategy will be unsuccessful if the organization rejects the declared new normal, while re-educative strategies may face resistance if the new way of doing things seems more expensive or unnecessarily difficult compared to the present process.

C.3.3. Power-Coercive Strategies

Power-coercive strategies seek to impose change upon an unwilling or very compliant organization. Here, the best path to change may be the shortest, whereby an assumed legitimate authority declares the change to occur, and the organization makes it happen. Certainly this follows the traditional concept of military command – what the commander (or leader) says, goes. However, command authority is not the only form this takes. Legislation, policy changes, and doctrine are also coercive, directing that the organization adopt behaviors or attitudes. In all cases, compliance is a necessary ingredient for success. If the authorities' directions go unheeded, change fails to occur.

However, power-coercive strategies can also occur bottom-up, as the rank and file of an organization can mass in protest against an unjust policy or regulation, or in support of a desired change.[48] While less common in military organizations, there have been plenty of instances where the voices of unjustly treated service members have brought about significant changes in the military structure and culture, such as in the aftermath of highly-publicized reports of sexual harassment.

Conflict or confrontation is the ultimate engine of these strategies, whether it is war (e.g., the need to develop and field the MRAP), non-violent actions (protests or negotiations), judicial decisions, or altering power structure (e.g., reliefs of command). This conflict can be beneficial, driving toward a more desirable state of the organization, or detrimental, placing the organization's survival in a state of risk. These strategies also depend on the organization's views of its leaders. Leaders who use power-coercive strategies when the organization would prefer more participative varieties (i.e., normative) risk alienating the members and undermining the intended change.

C.3.4. Relationship with "Toxic" Leadership

It is our experience that military officers conflate toxic leadership with power-coercive strategies of change and assume participative strategies (e.g., normative and re-educative) are antidotes. However, all the strategies listed in Chin and Benne can be equally beneficial or destructive dependent on the context and the intentions and actions of the leadership. In one instance, one of this paper's authors served in a large headquarters whereby the leadership chose to bring in a consultant (with whom they had a prior working relationship) to address a perceived problem with the organization. The consultant attempted to exercise a normative strategy through sensing sessions and working groups; unfortunately, the consultant inaccurately assumed the perceived problem was highly amplified, and pushed a pre-determined but unproven solution favored by leadership. This misstep resulted in a discredited change effort and a strained relationship between the headquarters staff and the leaders.

Rational-empirical strategies are also prone to toxic situations when organizations bring a private-sector solution into the military context. One of this paper's authors was involved in the failed adoption of a balanced scorecard approach to management, an approach popular in both government and the corporate world at the time. As part of a service-wide initiative, the balanced scorecard-based system intended to provide senior leaders with real-time access to information about the readiness of its major commands. The new system required organizations undertake extensive and time-consuming efforts to create quantifiable measures to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of routine actions. Unit leaders, however, found devising the measures difficult, and considered them inaccurate or unsuitable as replacements for assessing human-conducted activities. Hence, they distrusted the use of such measures at higher levels, and regarded the initiative as inherent micromanagement.

On the other hand, power-coercive strategies to change are strongly beneficial in times when organizations must comply, even if the change goals are widely accepted. The aftermath of the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act ("Goldwater-Nichols") is a good example. Although implementation of the Act alone greatly affected the way the services interacted and altered the military's relationship with Congress, it did not automatically create the culture of jointness so widely accepted today. Rather, it was through the continued emphasis by senior military and civilian leaders on the benefits of operating as a joint force, implementation of joint

professional military education, publication of joint doctrines, and norming of joint assignments as part of one's military career that brought about the desired culture change. Military leaders coercively instituted all of these actions over the initially skeptical officer corps in each of the services. Congressional and joint leaders continue to leverage power-coercive strategies to overcome factors that might encourage the return of service parochialism such as budgetary battles and preservation of key programs.

D. Diagnosing the Organization

"Is the organization doing things right? Is the organization doing the right things? What is being missed?"[49]

Clearly, in order to effect change in any form at any level, it is important to determine what needs to be changed. Kotter focuses on factors that at an operational level should be identifiable – market forces, internal complacency, and the potential impacts of crises. When elevated to the strategic level in a very large organization where the environment is much more dynamic and internal performance factors much more difficult to measure, deciding what needs to be changed *and at which level* is tougher. As stated above, when communicating the need for change across a very large organization, different subunits may have completely different perspectives on whether or not a change effort is urgent or even required. An Army-level mandate from the Pentagon may not resonate much at a battalion in Fort X in the continental U.S. or Base Y in a forward deployed location.

The challenge for change agents within a very large organization is to get past the symptoms and indicators of a problem and seek the root causes. This helps address the issue of changes being, or appearing to be, externally driven. Recasting the sense of urgency in terms of underlying causes help separate the crisis from the problem and positions leaders to demonstrate more ownership of the change.

This section introduces several streams of literature on organizational performance and diagnostic models. It offers two models, both of which serve as useful theoretical lenses and models applicable for practical use. The first, Weisbord's Six-Box Model, first published in 1976, is a very simple but powerful model that applies to processes at any level of an organization. The Burke-Litwin (1992) Model adds levels of detail and more helpfully describes processes residing at two levels of an organization, day-to-day transactions and strategic-level transformations.

D.1. Weisbord's Six-Box Model

Weisbord (1976) developed his six-box model as a result of two decades' consulting experience and two concerns. The first was previous models were too complicated to be of use. The second regarded the gap between theory and practice. Thus, Weisbord designed the model as a simple way for leaders to approach questions about the organization's performance without

undergoing the cumbersome process of applying tenets from the spectrum of organizational theorists. Figure 4 shows the six boxes and the questions associated with them.

Weisbord's diagnostic model incorporated both formal and informal structures and processes, which he expressed as the system that exists on paper versus what people actually do.[50] He cautioned against assuming problems within the organization are personality-driven, and therefore confined to particular individuals. Weisbord's experience was problems of that nature tended to take root across organizations and become embedded in the organizational culture, such that removing the individuals in question would not solve the whole problem.

Organizational leaders can use the model two ways – either to assess strengths and weaknesses in general or to conduct a forensic analysis on a particular product or service that failed to meet expectations. In both cases, it is important that the consultant determine and sustain the proper scope of analysis. Thus, a review of readiness reporting could assess the readiness reporting system writ large or tackle one particular problematic report (e.g., one where the process of generating readiness data clearly and measurably failed). In either case, applying Weisbord's model can help ascertain the differences (and their relative importance) between formal and informal systems -- between *what is* and *what ought to be*.

Figure 4. Weisbord's (1976) original six-box organizational diagnostic model[51]

D.2. Burke-Litwin Model of Organizational Performance and Change

Weisbord's model is by no means the only one, and different models have emphasized different aspects of organizational behavior. For this primer, we will present the Burke-Litwin (1992) model of organizational performance as one alternative since it provides a more detailed look at Weisbord's simpler six boxes and because it views change as the expressed purpose for diagnosing organizational behavior.[52] The resulting model assesses twice the variables in organizational behavior as Weisbord, albeit in a more complex model. However, the model neatly divides into two nested levels, as shown in Figure 5 – transactional factors that govern the management of routine activities, and transformational factors associated with leading change in the organization.

Figure 5. Burke-Litwin (1992) Model of Organizational Performance and Change[53]

Note: Transformational Factors are colored/shaded. Transactional Factors are in white.

The model advocates two key implications. This first is that transactions determine organizational climate. Five types of transactions affecting climate include: (1) effects of mission clarity or lack thereof, (2) roles and responsibilities related to structure and managerial practice, (3) establishment of standards and commitment to them, (4) fairness of rewards, and (5) customer focus versus internal pressures.[54] Each of these relate to interactions among one or more of the transactional boxes in Figure 5, and thus allows for a ready set of factors to pursue when dealing with issues of climate. The model professes these transactions produce incremental change in an organization.

The model's second key implication is that "culture change requires transformation."[55] Transformational variables, shown as the darkened boxes in Figure 5, represent change stemming from organizational interactions with the environment, including those with stakeholders like Congress, allies and partners, industry, or other federal agencies. Given the level at which these

interactions occur, the model attests these transformational variables produce more holistic change within an organization.

D.3. Challenges of Undertaking a Diagnostic Effort

Just because someone perceives a problem does not mean the organization must pursue a solution to it. Ideally, one would want all problems in an organization identified and fixed as soon as possible, so the organization operates at peak efficiency and maximum effectiveness. However, just as pursuing change incurs risk, so too does any diagnostic effort. The very acts of openly identifying an existing problem and undertaking efforts to collect and analyze data are potentially disruptive to organizations. After all, the right data is rarely available without having to ask others or assemble pieces of information from multiple data sources. Lewin's restraining forces do not wait for a change effort to start, they act on any hint that an organization is contemplating change. Consequently, leaders seeking to conduct a diagnosis of their organizations must exercise caution.

U.S. military organizations often rely on consultants to help with the diagnosis and communicate the need for such actions as part of the normal course of seeking to improve performance. Typically, the consultants are *external*, contracted from private enterprise or manpower borrowed from another U.S. military organization. In the latter case, these may be individuals or 'tiger teams' of experts from a higher level headquarters or schoolhouse organizations sent on assistant visits.

Sometimes, however, U.S. military organizations rely on *internal consultants*, whereby leaders are charged with investigating, collecting and analyzing data, and reporting findings within their own organizations in response to senior leader inquiries. The professional character of the U.S. military itself is an example of internal consultancy, demanding its leaders exercise initiative to identify and pursue performance problems and report them up the chain of command as required. In both cases, leaders acting as internal consultants face challenges in developing a comprehensive and actionable case for change.

Scholars have long studied the challenges facing external and internal consultants, with the latter challenges often proving more difficult and more highly sensitive. This subsection has two parts, the first describing three common dilemmas facing consultants in general, and the second discussing specific challenges facing U.S. military leaders when either working with or serving as consultants.

D.3.1. Harrison's (1990) Three Dilemmas

Harrison (1990) offers three dilemmas that consultants typically face when negotiating the terms of a diagnostic effort.[56] The first is the *goals dilemma* that governs the scope of the effort. Is the intent to pursue a narrow issue that change agents can diagnose and report upon quickly, or does it require a much broader and longer-term effort? Larger consulting projects induce more

risk, as they often encompass a broader spectrum of goals which face a greater likelihood of diverging interests between the organization and its personnel. Certainly the larger the diagnostic project, the greater the chance leaders across the organization will perceive its goals and priorities differently. This could complicate the consultant's ability to collect data as goals could require a spectrum of deliverables from merely providing information to fully developing change strategies. Further, diagnostics by internal consultants is especially risky as the leader may encounter a lack of cooperation or even be ostracized by others for getting their noses too far into other people's businesses.[57]

One of the authors of this primer had an experience with this dilemma while serving as a special assistant to the commander of a combined force in an operational theater. Newly arrived in theater, the commander issued a requirement to determine how well the coalition staff was working together. A point of discussion when the task was issued was whether or not the requirement was to merely report information or develop courses of action, with the difference being how much time it would take and the potential disruption to the new commander's ability to chart a positive course for the command. As a result, the mission was limited to information gathering, and in the course of a single afternoon, the author uncovered some specific impediments to staff actions stemming from national-level rivalries. As a new Chief of Staff was due within days, the commander elected to handle the matter discreetly with him soon after arrival.

Harrison's second dilemma is the *participation dilemma*, described as follows: Does the consultant decide to do it all, or involve others? Discretion may mandate the former, especially if the subject of the diagnosis is sensitive and ripe for organizational backlash. This method also usually produces a more objective result, although it risks the consultant missing out on important information only available from organizational members. Wider involvement by the organization is probably better for less sensitive studies, as organizational members may be more forthcoming with data and ideas. It may also result in better organizational commitment to the resulting recommendations.

One of the authors of this primer took part in multiple organizational performance studies that spanned the spectrum of participation. At one end, the author was involved in a study that sought to determine the impacts of a base closure overseas, which was necessarily sensitive and therefore close-hold. At the other end, the author was a participant in a series of organizational performance studies involving an external consultant, in which the organizational leadership and member focus groups were included. The levels of involvement were each appropriate to the goals of the study; however more involvement did not necessarily lead to better achievement of the goals.

Harrison's third dilemma relates to *politics*, which Harrison defined as regarding who benefits from the organizational assessment – the whole organization or just a specific entity?[58] Although the assessment may aspire to benefit the whole organization, it may actually end up

benefitting only the sponsor – the leader commissioning the effort. Perceptions concerning the study will not only affect how participants will support or resist the data collection effort, they can also have a profound impact on the consultant's ability to perform duties outside of the study and after its conclusion.

A particularly unsuccessful change effort that one of the authors of this primer participated in failed because of the implications of this dilemma. The sponsoring leader entered the position with a conviction that change was required and set upon an effort to review the organization for the purposes of building a case. The author's efforts to engage with the organization's staff directors were generally futile, except for those few who were clearly disadvantaged under the previous leadership. The diagnostic effort was never completed and eighteen months later the sponsor departed the command without having enacted a tangible change strategy.

The above also highlights two important ethical concerns that warrant the internal consultant's attention. First is the importance of *confidentiality*,[59] particularly when studying problems within an organization that may shed light on poor performance of individuals. Trust is absolutely critical for the internal consultant, both with the sponsor and with any and all participants; the internal consultant must do everything possible to maintain this trust.

The second is *objectivity*[60] and removal of bias, including when the sponsor appears to be pursuing the study with preconceived outcomes in mind. This is particularly important in defense enterprise situations whereby senior defense officials are looking to justify a *fait accompli* despite substantive evidence supporting a different course of action. Unfortunately, the pre-made decision may well have come from much higher authorities and the sponsor may have no choice. In such cases, the consultant has a responsibility to present, in an unbiased manner, the available evidence and his/her recommendation in the best interest of the organization.

D.3.2. Pitfalls in Performing the Diagnosis

Performing the diagnosis amounts to collecting data, conducting analysis, and determining the key problems to solve through a change effort. While it sounds simple, the challenge for the consultant lies in the incomplete, errant, or misleading data with which he/she must contend. Data from interviews with organizational members, for example, can be biased by either the participant (e.g., trying to steer the findings) or by the consultant (e.g., pushing a preconceived notion of what's going on). Consultants must carefully review data collected from records or knowledge management systems to ensure its trustworthiness and reliability – not all organizations input the same data the same way, and not all organizations are equally diligent about their record keeping. The condition of the data will be a factor in the levels of confidence in the findings.[61]

Even with the best possible data, there are three challenges that consultants should consider in their analyses. The first is *levels of analysis*, which Burke-Litwin discusses in the form of the transformational-transactional boundary.[62] It is important that defense managers not confuse strategic with 'macro'. In fact, some strategic issues of the defense enterprise are 'micro' in nature – consider human resource management whereby performance across the entire defense enterprise is effectively gauged one Soldier at a time, then aggregated in the form of statistics. Defense managers must be clear and consistent about the levels of analysis they are using.

The second challenge is *defining terms*. A perfect example where this becomes extremely important is when discussing vague terms such as 'efficiency' or 'economy' when diagnosing organizational behavior. For example, consider how different stakeholders might weigh the efficiency of common installation activities such as medical clinics, family housing, or morale, welfare, and recreation facilities and services. Is the service efficient in that the activity provides the maximum level of service for its available resources? Or that the customer receives expeditious service? Or that the activity provides service with minimal waste of resources and minimal undesired effects (e.g., environmental damage)? A detailed definition of terms, and the consistent use of them, is key.

The third and greatest challenge is the *distributed environment* and its impacts on the reliability of any data collected. A service or joint-wide study will naturally involve a global array of agencies and stakeholders, with the potential for extensive remote data collection. Critical thinking, objectivity, and identification of bias become vital in ensuring the rigor and quality of the data collection, analysis, and presentation of findings. Even under the most favorable considerations when all parties involved in a study support the objectives and are transparent in their contributions, the consultant must consider parochial interests and local issues. A respondent in an overseas command may question how well defense managers in the Pentagon 'understand' the situation in theater, and can offer errant data. The defense manager must also continuously self-reflect on one's own data collection methods. Do they introduce bias or pre-suppose an assumed problem or solution? Do they gather all the data the consultant intends? Sometimes, important performance data only comes to light in face-to-face sessions or working groups, which is not always possible due to limited time and travel budgets.

D.3.3. Performing the Diagnosis – Miles and Hubermann (1994)

With the diagnosis challenges in mind, there are a number of published strategies for performing the analysis and articulating the results despite possible incompleteness or inconsistencies in the data. In reviewing various models, Miles and Hubermann's (1994) thirteen tactics[63] stand out as particularly useful. Instead of promoting a large, comprehensive strategy that may not fit each organization perfectly, their thirteen tactics constitute a somewhat sequenced menu of tools consultants can use at their discretion. This paper summarizes eight tactics below that are broadly applicable for military organizations:

1. *Noting Patterns and Themes*. Recurring patterns in the data can often suggest important findings, such as "*variables* involving similarities and differences among categories" or "*processes* involving connections in time and space."[64] The authors warn, however, the detection of patterns is just a first step, and the consultant must not overlook disconfirming evidence from elsewhere in the data.

2. *Seeing Plausibility*. Sometimes the data may seem random, with no clear patterns (or at least not enough to explain everything going on). Using intuition, the consultant attempts to draw out possible explanations for what otherwise might not make sense. But, once such an explanation is proffered, evidence of it must be pursued. Otherwise, it remains an unproven hypothesis and not necessarily something that the organization must fix.

3. *Clustering*. Are there patterns among the patterns? This tactic pulls together patterns and plausible explanations to categorize them as wholes. For example, patterns of distrustful behaviors across multiple subcommands might suggest a broader trust issue for the major command under study.

4. *Making Metaphors*. Metaphors are a way of making sense of complex ideas. Clustering the patterns may produce categories that are technically useful, but might not offer helpful explanations. In a case involving massive backlogs of administrative staff work in a particular supervisor's office, there is a measurable difference between that office being a 'road block' versus simply being 'vigilant' or 'enforcing standards.' Miles and Hubermann offer a question that can help in articulating findings: "If I only had two words to describe an important feature at this site, what would they be?"[65]

5. *Counting*. How many times an issue arises and how consistently it surfaces can be important clues. Counting instances of key points raised in interviews or evidenced in the records can help prioritize the key findings. Which are pervasive and deserve more attention? Which are mildly interesting or, in the end, rather ho-hum (or are only important to a few members of the organization)?

6. *Making Contrasts and Comparisons*. This is another way of sifting through the many patterns that may emerge. How does something compare between two organizational units: leaders and the rank and file, two separate garrisons, two independent commands, etc.? Sometimes the differences are consistent with expectations – for example one would expect some natural differences to show when comparing garrison services between continental U.S. and overseas-based commands. However, differences that are unexpected or not easily explained may indicate a significant finding.

7. *Partitioning*. Sometimes the pattern is not a single pattern, but is comprised of three or five different and important components, each of which may be a finding in itself. The backlogging problem mentioned earlier could be the result of several important findings integrated together into one big problem – (1) undermanning of the admin staff, (2) lack of training, (3) lower-level supervisors pushing up poor products, and (4) confusing or conflicting guidance from above.

8. *Noting Relationships Between Variables*.[66] A variable is a number or condition in the data that can change. Sometimes it can be quantified, like processing time for a staff action, or categorized, such as morale being high, moderate, or low. If you note that low morale tends to accompany longer processing times, it may indicate an important relationship. Relationships can take on many forms: (1) *correlated*, meaning that whenever one goes up, the other goes up (e.g., pay increases and morale) or when one goes down, the other goes down; (2) *inverse*, meaning whenever one goes up, the other goes down or vice versa (e.g., stress management training and sick days); (3) *causal*, meaning that one going up appears to cause the other to eventually go up.

Using such tactics effectively means getting beyond the obvious, which typically appears at lower levels of analysis. Widespread problems at the individual level will appear as evident patterns across the organization. However, taking action at the strategic level requires reducing those patterns to identify the *systemic* problems that require strategic-level intervention; the organization could merely apply a plethora of localized actions to resolve widespread problems that do not command such strategic level attention.

E. Crafting the Change Effort

Should the analysis produce evidence suggesting an organizational change effort is necessary, the next step is to begin developing the change plan. Kotter's *Leading Change* offers several useful steps, among them establishing the sense of urgency and communicating the change vision. However, having a vision and being able to communicate it across the U.S. military are very different entities. Among smaller organizations, leaders may be able to articulate a change vision members can easily understand and accept (or resist, see Section F). Among large organizations like the U.S. military however, the diverse perspectives of its members make it difficult for one statement of vision to explain all aspects of the change effort sufficiently well or clearly. In short, organizational leaders must tailor the statement of vision to clearly and succinctly express the change vision to a wide range of stakeholders; this also helps the action officers plan and organize the change effort – providing sufficient descriptions of the who, what, when, where, why, and how – so that the vision is adequately feasible, suitable, and acceptable for presentation to the appropriate audience(s).

This section has two subsections. The first presents a way of organizing the elements of the change vision using our proposed Mission-Structure-Process-Culture continuum, a

simplification of Weisbord's six-box model. The second presents the phasing of change efforts according to W. Warner Burke – *pre-launch*, *launch*, and *post-launch* – which helps proponents initiate and monitor the development, planning, and implementation of change efforts.

E.1. Planning the Change – the Mission-Structure-Process-Culture Continuum

In our view, an important aspect of U.S. military culture is its receptivity to objective analysis and well-conceived plans. Although this culture does not necessarily assure launch of a well-planned change effort, it does offer a greater likelihood of filtering out fads and poorly articulated visions. The question becomes how to develop an effective change vision that leaders can communicate across a wide variety of internal and external stakeholders.

In this regard, we must amend Kotter's six characteristics of effective visions (imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and communicable[67]) to add a seventh, *actionable*. For the U.S. military, this means a vision readily packaged into a comprehensive and cohesive plan, including consideration of resources. Whereas Kotter defers the development of plans and budgets to follow the leadership function of building a vision and strategy, military stakeholders must simultaneously consider vision and resources to determine feasibility.

Military leaders tend to accept the adage that "Vision without resources is hallucination."[68] Put another way, leaders confront many a good idea put forth in planning sessions and conferences with questions about funding and resource availability. Failure to answer those questions relegates the idea to mere wishful thinking.

Although the proponent may not have all the details and budgets figured out pre-launch, the change vision must adequately consider both how to execute implementation and how to communicate the elements of the execution plan. Stakeholders will want to know how the organization will execute the change vision, how long it will take, and what kinds of disruption the organization will experience in the process of achieving the vision.

The Mission-Structure-Process-Culture (MSPC) continuum we propose helps conceptualize the strategies and plans that will bridge the vision with the allocation of resources. In other words, the continuum connects ends with means early in the process. In turn, this helps leaders express what is going to change and why, while convincing stakeholders the change effort is feasible, suitable, and acceptable. Figure 6 depicts this continuum.

It is important to note Figure 6 shows an iterative process: the initial diagnosis leads to the development of a change effort, which produces potentially more and new information leading to adjusted diagnoses. Kotter emphasized effective vision statements are flexible and responsive to changing conditions.[69] By employing the continuum, proponents can determine when flexibility is needed and when the vision should remain resilient in light of changing conditions.

Figure 6. The Mission-Structure-Process-Culture Continuum

The process begins with the diagnosis. The three simple questions offered at the top of Figure 6 help partition the diagnosis into three 'buckets.' The first question "What must change?" represents the clear delta between the current state and the desired state, even in the case where the organization already functioning optimally. "What must stay the same?" is an equally important question and sometimes gets lost in the zeal to pursue change. As previously noted, change is disruptive, so it is useful to clarify that which will remain stable, thereby facilitating acceptance of the idea. These first two questions help focus on whether the organization is doing the right things.

The third question "What must be corrected?" considers what the organization is doing right or wrong. Diagnoses arriving at this question presume the organization is sub-optimally performing the tasks for which it is structured and resourced to do. Typically, the answers to this question involve training, time, leadership, followership, or breaking bad habits.

E.1.1. Vision

The answers to these three questions help shape the overarching expression of the desired end state in the form of a *vision*, the "picture of what the future looks like."[70] Although often seen as a function of leaders, visions should be constructed collaboratively so that it can be

communicated widely to "provide a sense of ultimately purpose, direction, and motivation for all members and activities."[71] Unfortunately, there is no blueprint for an effective and inspiring vision, but there are plenty of clear indicators of bad ones.

Here is a quick summary of Kotter's six characteristics of effective visions, followed by various ways of spotting ineffective ones. First, visions should be *imaginable*, such that the picture of the future is clear and grounded in reality. If it is too abstract or appears to favor certain parts of the organization over others, organizational members may not find the vision inspiring enough to change and may even resist it.[72] A particular challenge for visions in the military is the extensive breadth of internal and external stakeholders to engage, which may cause leaders to go too broad, too abstract, or too inclusive. The result may be a vision statement that fails to convey a change from the status quo. If the organization reacts with "that's what we are already doing!" the vision is likely not imaginable.

Second, visions ought to be *desirable*, reflective of something that is "appealing" to the organization and that conveys the urgency to change.[73] This is challenging when the organization is satisfied with the *status quo*, such that the vision must be appealing enough to warrant the additional energy. A potential question becomes whether the vision is promising too much. This can occur when the need for external stakeholder support causes the proponent to overstate the end state. This can lead to a vision that earns cynical responses from internal stakeholders.

The next three go together and are very important in the military context. Kotter says that visions must be *feasible*, *focused*, and *flexible*, including "realistic, attainable goals, … provid[ing] guidance in decision making, … [and] allowing individual initiative and alternative responses."[74] Communicating the vision includes a "clear and rational understanding of the organization"[75] which should be connected to the diagnostics already performed and aid members in understanding what their role might be in achieving the vision. The U.S. military tends to do this through analogizing transformational change with operational plans (specifically, paragraph 3 "Concept of the Operation" in the standard operations order). One might see a 'vision statement,' a one-sentence expression of the vision, followed by intent, key tasks, and a measurable end state.

For very large organizations, feasibility, focus, and flexibility are judged in the eyes of the stakeholders, especially deep within the hierarchy. Thus, for a vision to satisfy these characteristics at the higher levels, its goals and direction should be clearly re-stated at echelon throughout the organization. This is where our additional characteristic, *actionable*, takes on further meaning. An actionable vision fosters re-statement and allows subordinate commanders and distributed elements to develop supporting change efforts and activities. Unfortunately, sometimes communicating the change vision amounts to pushing the high-level vision statement downward as is, and expect individual members to carry the same message (perhaps printed on a card or other cuing mechanism telling the member what to say). Such uniformity violates flexibility. While such top-down driven forms of communication are important in matters of

organizational policy, they can undermine a transformation effort and alienate the organizational membership by perceptions of something being 'shoved down their throats.'

Kotter's final characteristic, *communicable*, seems obvious. If the vision is not "easy to communicate,"[76] it is unhelpful. However, Kotter's follow-on phrase, "can be successfully explained in five minutes," bears further examination for the U.S. military, whose leaders sometimes cannot afford even five minutes to hear the whole explanation. Instead, the proponent must condense the vision down to a one minute statement, or 'elevator pitch.'[77] The obvious challenge is avoiding the loss or glossing over of elements that convey the other characteristics of the vision – desirability, feasibility, and focus in particular. Furthermore, the proponent must be careful to avoid seeing the 'elevator pitch' become the entire pitch as the vision is subsequently shared among second and third parties. Also, as the vision evolves (see feedback loop in Figure 6), proponents must ensure that the communications of it evolve in kind and account for the previous iterations that have already been shared.

From the vision come the component parts – Mission, Structure, Process, and Culture – that operationalize the vision into the elements of a strategy.

E.1.2. Mission

The *Mission* portion of the continuum addresses the purpose and identity of the organization. An effective mission portion clearly articulates what will change. In changes related to new weapons systems or restructuring (such as consolidation, downsizing, or realignment), the purpose of the organization changes subtly but profoundly, enough to engender anxiety and confusion. Downsizings and consolidations are particularly prone to this as the stated mission may not change but the manner that the mission is performed does. For example, consolidating financial management activities from local finance units to centralized automated processing did not immediately change the 'stated' mission of the finance units (the provision of financial management services to local commanders), but it markedly changed their roles in the overall financial management structure. The units' purposes, therefore, changed from providing full financial services at the local level, to primarily advising, enforcing policies, and providing quality assurance.

Mission is critical in transformational changes when new organizations are being formed. Again, the focus is less on the stated mission, and more on the desired purpose and identity of the organization. For example, when U.S. Africa Command formed in 2007, its stated mission was effectively no different from any other combatant command. However, the Department of Defense (DOD) established its purpose and identity to be uniquely suited for military-to-military engagements on the African continent, as evidenced by a commonly-used phrase in the command, "African solutions for African problems."[78]

Proponents should also include misalignments between the stated mission of the organization and its actual behaviors. 'Mission creep,' for example, occurs when stakeholders ask

organizations to do more than that for which they are resourced. Many U.S. military organizations face mission creep when new or unexpected requirements arise or because it adopts an emerging best practice. Since these dynamics rarely come with additional resources, mission creep often means other requirements within the stated mission drop. Do these natural adjustments in the organization's function constitute a change in purpose or organizational identity? The answer should be captured under *Mission.*

In addition to the aforementioned tension between the stated mission and assigned resources, proponents must consider two other important tensions. The first is the degree to which the mission really must be formally stated or allowed to emerge flexibly. Clarity in *Mission* does not equal rigidity, especially if the organization requires latitude as it evolves to meet the vision and stay aligned with the environment while undergoing change. The second is a tension between 'core' and 'non-core' functions. Most military organizations treat certain aspects of their stated mission as absolute and immutable – infantry maneuvers and takes ground, signal units provide communication, field artillery provides fire support. These are central to the unit's identity. Changes related to the core functions are likely to emote strong feelings and greater anxiety, where non-core functions might not. Thus, proponents should ensure arguments favoring change to core functions should especially consider opposing views and thoroughly address each in terms of what's best for the organization, lest they engender greater resistance.

E.1.3. Structure

Structure is more than just the organizational block and wire diagram. It encompasses all the formal and informal aspects of structure that can enhance or impede pursuit of the revised Mission.

Formal *Structure* is generally easier to capture, and the organizational diagram is usually a good place to start. The diagram shows the natural divisions of labor, which are often functional in nature, and standing relationships such as direct reports and advisory roles. Accompanying duty descriptions, formally conferred authorities and responsibilities, standing relationships with external stakeholders, and the layout of facilities and infrastructure are all part of the formal *Structure* to be considered. Even in service-wide transformational changes, much of the formal *Structure* will stay the same or experience minor adjustments. The G-staff structure, for example, has been quite resilient over the years, experiencing only minor evolutions despite attempts by the U.S. military to introduce alternate forms of staff organization.[79]

Informal *Structure* is much harder to capture during the diagnosis phase, and can pose a significant challenge when trying to clearly expressing it in change strategies. Unless a particular individual's roles are highly significant and vital toward pursuing the change effort, it is best to focus on informal structure at group level – such as boards, councils, working groups, tiger teams, and other structures used to horizontally integrate the organization and enhance performance of the mission. It is also important to capture changes in how the organization communicates with

itself, as much of this *Structure* is informal. For example, an organization may handle official matters via staff action process, but may use e-mail to push them through the system.

Structure should not be seen as immutable, especially in the areas of facilities and infrastructure. Many local change efforts involve reallocating physical plant to suit new ways of doing business; examples include constructing conference rooms, consolidating offices (or constructing one large building to replace several smaller ones), upgrading training and maintenance facilities, and incorporating technological solutions such as recabling, etc. Of course, change efforts involving facilities and infrastructure typically require early identification of funding and resources.

When considering the change strategy, it is important to bound the elements of *Structure* to just those necessary and sufficient to achieve the vision and satisfy the changes specified in the *Mission*. It is equally important to articulate existing *Structure* that will not change, as it aligns with the stable components of the *Mission*.

Balancing formal and informal *Structure* is the primary tension to consider when formulating this step. Bolstering or emphasizing formal structures help clarify the roles and responsibilities of the institution in developing and changing organizations to meet the change vision, but may affect the organization's adaptability. Conversely, greater reliance on informal structures may enhance the organization's ability to respond to a dynamic environment, but may run afoul of administrative policies and procedures related to generating manpower or resources.

E.1.4. Process

Process gets at how an organization enacts the *Structure* to achieve the *Mission*; it provides the what, when, and where. However, changes in *Structure* do not necessarily beget changes in *Process* or vice versa. Rather, organizations should analyze *Structure* and *Process* independently. Much of *Process* is captured in the transactional level of Burke-Litwin's model from Section D, particularly in management practices, policies and procedures, work unit climate, and identification of tasks.

As with *Structure*, there is a formal and informal component to *Process* that will appear in the change strategy. Formal *Process* includes policies and procedures, the decreed ways the organization executes its *Mission* using its available *Structure*. Procedures are more likely to be changeable than policies (especially those imposed from outside the organization), but policies can be adjusted given the right impetus for change. Management practices tend to be less formal, and reflect individual leaders' preferences (particularly at the more senior ranks). Expressions of *Process* in the change strategy must consider both, but again bound the effort toward only those aspects necessary and sufficient to achieve the vision.

It should be clear why *Structure* and *Process* are independent. Change efforts involving administrative matters often involve changing *Process* with minimal or no changes to *Structure*.

Change efforts involving fielding of new equipment may see significant changes to *Structure* (e.g., new facilities, reorganization) but ultimately little or no changes to *Process* (e.g., doctrine, training, chain of command, support activities). Rather, alignment of both *Structure* and *Process* to the *Mission* is paramount.

Tensions in the area of *Process* are numerous. This paper mentions three significant ones. The first addresses the free flow of information versus the security of that information. Most change efforts in the U.S. military involve the handling of information, with a preference for increased sharing being a common theme. However, increased sharing increases risk of lost or compromised information. If the information includes personally identifiable information or other sensitive data, increased sharing may introduce unacceptable risk.

A second tension relates to the pursuit of short-term ("quick") wins versus staying the long-term course. Kotter emphasizes the virtues of short-term wins as necessary for sustaining momentum in the change effort, however there are risks in over relying on them. In the formative stages of the change effort, seeking quick wins may lead proponents to emphasize the 'easy' or uncontroversial aspects of the effort, which may not exemplify the real long-term challenges that will arise as the organization pursues the change vision. For example, if the change effort is about improving a service-wide process but the quick win only applies to the proponent's own unit or base, it will be difficult to convince the entire service of the win's relevance or applicability. Quick is helpful, but wins that demonstrate likelihood of long term success are preferable.

The third tension is between interpersonal 'processes' and automated 'systems.' Many change efforts in the U.S. military trade one for the other. Automated solutions are often pushed for their efficiency (consistent, less expensive, etc.) in dealing with routine matters or managing massive amounts of data. Interpersonal solutions place the human in the loop where technology fails to perform or there is greater need for professional judgment.

E.1.5. Culture

It is beyond the scope of this paper to define organizational culture in the general sense. Rather, for the purposes of this continuum, *Culture* is focused on two things – how the members think and act; in other words, dispositions[b] and behaviors.

When one considers areas in the diagnosis requiring correction, often matters of dispositions and behaviors come to mind. Organizations that are properly structured and resourced to achieve a mission but fail to accomplish it typically fall short here. Weisbord's model talked of incentive and rewards, while Burke-Litwin discusses climate, motivation, needs and values, and individual skills. Trust and communication can also be factors. Shortfalls in any of

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[b] This paper will prefer 'disposition' over 'attitude' as notions of 'changing attitudes' are often misconstrued as punitive or remedial. Large-scale change efforts often require some degree of modifying how organizational members think about performing individual or group tasks, which constitutes a dispositional change.

these can result in conditions where individual members fail to perform, diminishing organizational performance, and requiring corrective action to remedy. Many 'culture change' efforts target such failures (e.g., sexual harassment).

However, the existing culture can also be misaligned with what is required to satisfy the vision. Therefore, *Culture* might include changes in dispositions and behaviors novel to the organization, and therefore potentially frightening. For example, introducing new technologies to replace non-technological solutions may make sense for improving efficiency and performance, and the associated changes in *Mission*, *Structure*, and *Process* may be logical and sound. Yet, the new solutions may still raise levels of anxiety, as predicted in Bridges' model of transitions, because the benefits of the systems may not be clear, or members have heard stories about how similar automation projects have failed or been riddled with problems.

Consequently, when formulating matters of *Culture*, the proponent should consider those dispositions or behaviors most relevant to enacting the changes in *Mission*, *Structure*, and *Process*. These matters should include those that require correction, as well as those likely to engender significant (especially emotional) responses. This will allow the resulting strategy to consider how the organization should transition to the desired state as the change occurs.

E.2. The Change Effort as a Campaign – Burke's *Pre-Launch, Launch,* and *Post-Launch*

The above synthesis should produce sufficient insight as to what elements of the strategy, plans, and resources requirements will be necessary to promote the fledgling change effort. Obviously in cases where funding discussions are minimally required to begin socializing the effort, the proponent must make estimates based on satisfying the proposed *Structure* and *Process* changes. Tolerance for flexibility is an important consideration; oftentimes estimates become ingrained with the change effort, even if proponents develop those estimates based on assumptions which later prove to be in error.

As this subsection discusses, the timing of the change effort will help determine the production and evolution of such details. As the change effort moves from idea to implementation, it will most likely require increased levels of detail to earn support. The challenge for proponents is getting the effort to implementation while minimizing the calls for 'more studies,' 'more time,' and other potential delays. Burke's discussion of the phases of change efforts – which he referred to as *pre-launch*, *launch*, and *post-launch* – is useful in this endeavor.[80] We will analogize these phases with the construction of a hypothetical new building, whereby Burke's phases begin once a proponent has decided that the new building is needed.

E.2.1. *Pre-Launch* – Moving from Idea to Implementation (Using Van de Van & Poole's Motors)

According to Burke, the pre-launch phase is when proponents formulate the change effort and socialize it with key stakeholders. Once the proponent has performed the diagnosis,

developed a change vision, and conducted MSPC analysis, the effort is squarely in pre-launch. The proponent's goal now is to get the effort to implementation. In the example of the hypothetical building, *pre-launch* is when the proponent operationalizes the requirement in the form of a building design, necessary funding, and leadership approval. Proponents should carefully consider how to present the strategy, plans, and resources guiding the change effort to earn the support of internal and external stakeholders. Two useful areas for conversation during this period regard how the effort is to be governed (e.g., Van de Ven and Poole's motors) and what approaches are most suitable (e.g., Chin and Benne's strategies).

Governing the change effort involves how an organization divides, integrates, sustains, and monitors (or manages) its energy for implementing change. Figure 7 shows a commonly-used template for change efforts within the U.S. military that includes divisions of labor (often expressed as "lines of effort," or LOE), milestones, synchronization, and decision points. Each LOE typically has its own subordinate proponent, subordinate goals and milestones, and decision points, while the overall proponent takes responsibility to synchronize the LOEs to achieve the overall change.


Figure 7. General-Purpose Template for Planned (Life-Cycle) Change Efforts

E.2.1.1. Pacing the Change – Time vs. Event Driven

Synchronizing the LOEs can occur in multiple ways. In a seminal article on organizational change, Gersick (1994) described two ways change efforts tend to progress – *time-driven* and *event-driven* – noting change efforts often exhibit both. One can argue most change efforts in the U.S. military exhibit time-driven behaviors, where the calendar dictates the creation or presence of key milestones. The annual budget process (PPBE), cyclic reports and testimony to Congress (from annual to quarterly), and internal progress reporting tend to have fixed timeframes. In the Defense Acquisition System, Milestone decisions are similarly time-driven, as completion of one Milestone sets a 'deadline' for the next, and the ability to meet that deadline (regardless of its feasibility or accuracy) drive perceptions as to whether the effort is on schedule. In other words, an effort initially assigned a three year deadline, even though it would logically take four years to complete, is 'behind schedule' even though it may be proceeding as logically expected.

Time-driven change suits military culture well because it assumes a proactive orientation – by programming the effort out over time, the organization is more likely to achieve long-term goals. It also allows senior leaders to better manage their calendars, scheduling important decisions or milestones well in advance; this dynamic spurs pursuing and sustaining *momentum* in change efforts.

Event-driven change tends to be more reactive, as the change effort progresses based primarily on events and requires more certainty about what success looks like. Such change efforts must often resurrect momentum, despite remaining stagnant for significant periods at a time. Gersick analogized event-driven change as a thermostat, rather than the alarm clock of time-driven change. That is, when an event occurs that kindles the needed sense of urgency, the leader should ramp up the effort. Determining when an effort should be event-driven can be tricky. Altering a common, popular, or well-ingrained business practice may require a specific triggering event for the organization to receive it favorably. On the other hand, if no such event occurs over an extended period, and the leader still views the change as needed, he/she may have to introduce time-driven strategies to facilitate the change.

If time-driven, then stakeholders will expect 'in-progress reviews' at various time intervals (either fixed, such as 'quarterly' or 'monthly,' or variable based on leadership availability); in anticipation of these milestones, LOE proponents will establish intermediate goals to meet prior to the in-progress review, using these goals as key indicators of overall progress toward the desired end state. If event-driven, like those based on Congressional hearings or a specific precursor condition in one of the LOEs, in-progress reviews may be less frequent or relegated to an as-needed basis. In either case, successful synchronization requires developing a clear and well-understood roadmap annotating each LOE's role in achieving the desired state.

E.2.1.2. Choosing the Motors of Change

Although the template appears suitable for only those change efforts driven by the *life-cycle motor*, it is flexible enough to apply to change efforts governed by the other Van de Ven and Poole motors detailed in Section C. Rather than dividing the labor by LOEs, the template divides it by subordinate groups acting independently. Efforts using the *teleological motor* direct the overall change effort at the local level by multiple units (or groups) simultaneously, while the main proponent monitors progress. As local solutions emerge that appear to approach the overall desired state, the main proponent promotes them as 'best practices' to adopt across the organization, thus combining the effort with the *life-cycle motor.* This is particularly useful when wider adoption requires dedicated additional resources beyond those the units can provide themselves. In U.S. military, this process is akin to taking a local solution and converting it into a 'program of record.'

The *teleological motor* is also suitable if there are already initiatives on-going in the field that can contribute to the change vision. The proponent should uncover and explore these initiatives, and then weigh the risks and benefits of subsuming or replacing them with a broader top-down change effort. For example, if two service component commands have found ways to streamline the processing of new security clearances, but there is pressure for a joint or service-wide solution, proponents should look carefully at which approach is best and mitigates unnecessary risk: (1) impose a top-down solution for processing clearances that overturns the local initiatives, (2) leverage the bottom-up efforts and allow a more general solution to emerge, or (3) a mix of both. While (1) may seem unpalatable, particularly if it negates local initiatives, it may ultimately prove best if the MSPC analysis at the higher levels shows the local efforts will not or cannot achieve the change vision. In the case of security clearances, this may come about if the local initiatives either do not help or exacerbate a bigger problem (i.e., unacceptable backlogs of pending clearance requests at the national level due to quality control issues among applications submitted locally).

Proponents can use the *dialectic motor* if there is clear controversy in the change effort, and the best solution arises when the competing groups (representing thesis and anti-thesis) pursue their own aims independently. Synthesis of the results into a common organization-wide solution becomes an event-driven decision by the main proponent. The iterative nature of the *dialectic motor* allows the competing groups to continue their independent efforts (recall that synthesis is not a permanent resolution of the competing ideas, but a temporary one that feeds back to the separate efforts).

If there is controversy or competition, the *dialectic motor* is likely already running. For example, this motor is constantly active in the midst of interservice disagreements, where joint synthesis invites (but does not ultimately resolve) on-going discussions over landpower versus airpower versus seapower. The publication of joint doctrine and the institution of joint systems and processes are change efforts manifesting this synthesis, and those activities clearly exercise

the *life-cycle motor* to force a single joint-based outcome. Similarly, changes within services between rival communities (e.g., conventional vs. special forces, infantry vs. armor, fighters vs. bombers, surface vs. submarine, and many, many more) may see the *life-cycle motor* imposed within an on-going *dialectic motor* to bring about a needed higher-order solution. Proponents in such cases should be careful to avoid viewing the change effort as a push for 'compromise,' which tends to suggest both sides giving up something (and typically the same amount) toward an arbitrary middle point. Proponents should instead seek a synthesized outcome that best reflects the achievement of the change vision.[81]

The *evolutionary motor* is one where the main proponent exercises more of a firm hand over the subordinate efforts, perhaps even assigning them in experimental fashion to multiple groups to see which variation 'wins.' A main proponent may take this approach when the aims are clear but the best or most efficient ways and means are uncertain; therefore, the best way to go about the change effort is through experimentation or exploration. A good example of this regards technological solutions where the right technologies are not yet available or have not even been developed. The difference from using localized initiatives *teleologically* is the degree to which the proponent drives the overall effort by prescribing the aims up front (again, the *teleological* motor allows more of the aims to emerge bottom-up). If the change vision involves solutions for self-powered vehicles to reduce the energy footprint and vulnerability of fuel convoys, the proponent might present the specifications to various defense industry experts (scientists and contractors both inside and outside the military) and ask, "How could we do this?" In this way, the *evolutionary motor* captures the most successful ideas and adopts them more widely, while abandoning the rest.

Can all four motors be used? Absolutely. In fact, this may be necessary in a massive joint or service-wide transformation effort, or in the establishment of new organizations and dissolution of old ones. While senior leaders may have a clear vision in mind, the devil is in the details of bridging that vision to actionable strategies, plans, and resources that require proponents to be open-minded over the various ways available to pursue that vision: innovation, experimentation, synthesis among divergent perspectives, and a well-conceived governance plan with appropriate division of labor, milestones and decision points, and integration of the effort. Considering the choice of motors is the key at pre-launch. Publishing the fully-formed strategy is a function of *launch*.

E.2.2. *Launch* – Toward Full Implementation (Using Chin and Benne's Strategies)

Burke's *launch* phase is about putting the change effort into action. Of note, this is different from the public announcement starting implementation of a change effort, which comes later. Burke describes the launch phase as when the message is spread, the planning of the initial events take place, and the organization is fully engaged on the pending change effort. Doing so requires organizations to deliberately decide to engage the organization and grant authority to the proponent to build the strategy, develop the plans, and acquire the resources in detail. *Launch*

transforms the question from *if* a change effort will occur, to *when* the change effort occurs. This transformation often occurs before the proponent determines *what* the details of the change effort will be. In the building construction example, *launch* begins with leadership approval to proceed with the idea, and might include all the civil approvals, environmental impacts reviews, tenants lined up and satisfying other stakeholder interests prior to breaking ground.

As an example, when DOD pursued its implementation plans in response to the pending repeal of the Don't-Ask-Don't-Tell (DADT) legislation, *pre-launch* regarded how the Department was going to organize the change effort, to include gathering the necessary information to inform the change strategy. The acts of senior leaders to travel world-wide and engage the force to collect reactions and ideas was part of the *launch*, not *pre-launch*. DOD leaders already made the decision to act (as a result of external stakeholder influence), but the detailed plans were not yet developed. The military knew it was going to do something, and that status quo was not an option. The implementation of the change (integration of gays into the military) was not necessarily a fait accompli, but the forward momentum realized by the time leaders engaged the force on the matter suggested ultimately negating the change would require a significant and difficult second decision (including further, potentially contentious, engagements with Congress, in this case). Meanwhile, knowledge of the pending change meant the organization was already reacting to it, with open discussions about how and why, along with the emergence of supporters and resistors. The first stage of the transition, *letting go* of an old attitude about homosexuals in the military, had begun.

During the *launch* phase, decisions surrounding which of Chin and Benne's strategies (rational-empirical, normative-reeducative, and power-coercive from Section C) should become clear. Obviously, the choice of strategies should suit the aims of the change effort, the preferences of the leaders promoting the change, and the receptiveness of the organization to the change. Efforts best fostered by traditional command-style direction, whereby leadership formally telling the organization 'do it' generates the necessary energy, should include *power-coercive* strategies. Again, this can be either when the organization favors the change and will be naturally compliant or when the organization strongly resists the change and compliance requires incentives.

Including *Rational-empirical* strategies is most appropriate when it is difficult for organizational members or leaders to identify progress toward the change vision. Sometimes elements of the change strategy are simply too abstract or subjective without the establishment of measures to aid in developing intermediate goals, milestones, and decision points. For example, the U.S. military establishes technological readiness levels to gauge how mature new technologies are, and therefore their suitability for inclusion in an acquisition program.[82] The inherent subjectivity and complexity in assessing such readiness demands established standards to help orient proponents and decision makers; otherwise assessing single technology developments would be too subjective, making integrating multiple technologies in a weapons platform or other complex system impossible to manage. The resulting nine Technological

Readiness Levels, a rationalized approach for pursuing change involving new technologies, provides that assessment capability.

In similar fashion, empirical approaches are suitable when quantifiable measures are available, reliable, valid, and helpful in measuring progress toward the change vision or synchronizing change across multiple communities. Validity is essential, as it is how well the numbers represent the actual situation. For example, if the change effort aims to improve backlogs in customer service by altering *Structures* and *Processes*, then measures focused on effectiveness and efficiency of the new *Structures* and *Processes* are clearly important. However, if the customer's perspective is not measured and the customer still experiences unacceptable delays in receiving service, then the integrity of the change effort can fall into question.[83]

Normative-reeducative approaches may fit when the change effort is corrective in nature (especially in the area of *Culture*) or when participative methods are essential to success. This is not to be confused with the natural inclusion of training that will accompany many U.S. military change efforts involving new weapons system platforms or administrative processes. Rather, *normative-reeducative* approaches become primary when organizations must rely on interventions to change dispositions and behaviors, reinforce established norms and values, or guide organizational members through a complex and potentially emotional transition. For example, the introduction of new efficiency reporting formats and requirements is often greeted with high anxiety and questions over how the new report may introduce unwarranted bias in selection board processes, fall victim to inflation or gaming by the rating chain, or otherwise unfairly disadvantage members. Participative strategies, both normative and re-educative, become essential for such change efforts to succeed, as they appropriately diagnose and address problematic dispositions and behaviors as well as equally inform and guide all internal stakeholders on the new structures and processes.

As with the motors, Chin & Benne's strategies can be combined. For example, re-education typically accompanies power-coercive strategies in change efforts geared at addressing internal crises. Here, leaders coercively reinforce organizational norms, yet organizations cannot assume inculcation and compliance due to the exigencies of human behavior (e.g., sexual harassment and assault response, suicide prevention awareness, information assurance, operational security). Thus, participative approaches supplement leadership direction to encourage compliance and uncover (and hopefully remove) barriers to change.

E.2.3. *Post-Launch* – Full Implementation

If the *launch* is done well, *post-launch* should be a non-event. For the construction of the new building, *post-launch* begins with the proverbial first shovel striking the ground, as proponents have already completed the hard work of preparing everyone for the construction of the building. All that's left is the construction (or implementation).

It is rarely that simple, of course, as the proponent must stay heavily engaged in monitoring progress and proposing adjustments to the change effort as required. Both Burke and Kotter agree, as do we, that communicating the change vision must never cease. There is a risk of waning interest and organizational energy levels once *post-launch* begins, or when the next major milestone is achieved, such as Initial Operating Capability.[84] The effort is no longer exciting or new. Senior leaders especially must be careful not to 'move on' prematurely, leaving the proponent to navigate the messy business of implementation entirely on his/her own. However, senior leaders are extremely busy and have numerous, competing, urgent priorities – thus the proponent plays a key role in keeping both the appropriate and the acceptable levels of senior leader attention on *post-launch* change efforts.

In post-launch, an old military adage comes to the fore – "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." Often, despite the best efforts to develop comprehensive strategies and plans, the actual implementation of the change effort brings unforeseen barriers to surface. It is similar to that first shovel hitting a pipe or opening a sinkhole that was not indicated on any utility plan, map, or in anyone's memory. Key for proponents is to swiftly identify the new barriers, determine their impact on the strategies and plans, and make adjustments. Again, if the organization properly launched its change effort, these early challenges should not negate the change vision; rather, adjustments to the implementation strategies or plans should be sufficient.

E.2.4. *Sustaining the Change* – Exercising Milestones and Decision Points

Once the change effort overcomes any initial challenges and finds itself in full implementation mode, proponents can turn their attention to governing the overall change effort, ensuring the initial divisions of labor, the time and event-driven methods of managing progress, and the integrative approaches all function according to the strategy. At this point, the change effort moves into the sustainment phase, during which two other barriers to change tend to surface.

The first barrier regards the energy required to ensure the appropriate and necessary collection of data to gauge progress. Especially if the change involves participative methods or distributed efforts, collecting data may be highly involved and analysis difficult. As with *post-launch*, organizations may divert energies to more pressing short-term concerns, in addition to facing the risk of implementers cutting corners to satisfy the proponent's demand for numbers in light of an upcoming milestone, decision brief, or other event. Similarly, the proponent may divert his/her own energies – possibly causing the change effort to drop in priority. Proponents must determine if the available data is sufficient to render a suitable assessment of progress to satisfy decision makers as they decide to continue the change effort as planned or adjust it in some way.

The second barrier, particularly for long-term change efforts, regards the turnover of leaders involved, both at senior and proponent levels. Although the U.S. military stresses the importance of continuity as leaders transition, this does not always translate into the unabated

continuance of change efforts initiated by a predecessor. Also, external stakeholders do not necessarily abide by the desire for continuity. For example, programs requiring Congressional funding may occasionally find themselves unfunded or underfunded simply based on changes wrought from the election cycle. While not all such turnovers can be predicted in advance, many can. It is incumbent on proponents to proactively communicate change efforts to new leaders and stakeholders.

Change efforts must strike the balance between what the organization can actually do, and the levels of energy required to sustain the change effort and maintain the appropriate levels of leader attention. Proponents should therefore not view the governance plan as permanent and immutable, as the situation may have changed such that timing or conditions driving decision points and milestones must also change. At the same time, proponents must also guard against organizational intransigence or procrastination whereby delaying the change effort constitutes a slippery slope to its premature demise. Thus, proponents should repeatedly review the governance plan during the change effort's life cycle to ensure leadership remains focused on the change vision and attentive to what the effort requires of them to attain completion and eventual realization of that vision.

F. Resistance and the Bigger Problem of Ambivalence

Naturally, when one's goal is to lead change, the *status quo* constitutes an adversary. In Kotter's view, the *status quo* perseveres in one of two ways – through the deliberate acts of those seeking to preserve it, or organizational barriers preventing individuals from supporting the change.[85] The former constitutes the traditional view of *resistance*, whereby people stand as obstacles in the way of progress. In Kotter's view, change efforts must quell resistance– if a "troublesome" supervisor gets in the way of change, he or she should go.[86]

The trouble with Kotter's use of "troublesome" is its oversimplicity. It draws from a classic narrative of a worker who has developed particular skills and knowledge which the change effort will make obsolete or require to change, and the worker does not wish to go along. It easily fits as the barrier to change using the *life-cycle motor*. The organization must change as a unitary whole; therefore, anyone not on board is an obstacle requiring removal. The message is "fix thyself or go home."

In the million-person organization using all motors of change, this view of *resistance* is too narrow. The *dialectic motor*, in particular, expects that some form of anti-thesis exists. When one considers the natural tensions that exist within the U.S. military, opposing perspectives are ever present and synthesis is necessary. For example, consider joint-service tensions or interservice rivalries, where these competing views are not merely entrenched but borne out of history, culture, and discrete areas of expertise. Change efforts that hold too closely to the life-cycle model and view resistance solely as an obstacle never gain that required synthesis. The desired change will ultimately not occur or fall far short of the goals.

In these organizations, the real challenge is *ambivalence*, which stems from both the thick vertical hierarchy and the global dispersion of the force. Simply put, forces in the field are not likely to understand the impetus behind a change effort, nor see its benefits in the same way. Time and distance cloud the message, and the priorities in the Pentagon do not always translate to the priorities in a geographic combatant command overseas, a major service command or base on the west coast, or a Reserve or National Guard unit. Even if all parties agree with the vision, they may do so passively. Perhaps they have too many things on their plate already, or they are uncomfortable taking the lead or getting involved until they see progress.

However, ambivalence is not strictly an obstacle; rather it is a potential source of energy ripe for change efforts to harness. This section begins with a summary of a paper on various conceptions of resistance and ambivalence at the individual level. It then follows with a focused discussion on how these forces come to bear across a very large organization.

F.1. Behavioral, Emotional, and Cognitive Reactions to Change

In her review of studies of resistance to change, Sandi Piderit (2000) found three different areas of emphasis, and each of these play into Kotter's troublesome supervisor. The most obvious is *behavioral*. Bosses or stakeholders take deliberate action (or inaction) to defy the change, or put forth reduced effort. These responses are relatively easy to observe, and change agents or senior leaders must address such behaviors. *Emotional* responses are also often observable, in the form of complaints or heightened anxiety associated with a change. In some cases, individuals may want to support the change effort, but cannot handle the thought of it. Scholars such as Argyris (1993) viewed these responses as the result of an individual's natural defensive routines, and offered remedies such as coaching to help overcome them.[87] *Cognitive* responses are harder to discern and can be characterized as reluctance, a state of not being ready to change.[88]

Ambivalence is a state of internal conflict, of competing desires or attitudes toward something.[89] Sometimes ambivalent conflicts pit one type of response against another. An individual may rationally support the aims of the change effort and want to help (cognitive), but feel negatively about the disruption it may cause (emotion). One can imagine how the promise of a new brigade combat team facility, complete with modern maintenance bays and other state-of-the-art upgrades, would garner favorable cognitive reactions -- until the Soldiers realize that for two years they may be working in temporary office trailers and maintain their vehicles in a muddy field at the far end of post. Another example is when the members do not agree with the change (cognitive) but also do not want to offend a leader they like (behavioral or emotional). They may follow the plan but do so unenthusiastically, or resort to indirect means (e.g., suggestion boxes or sensing sessions) to voice their lack of support.

Ambivalence also occurs within a category of responses. For example, cognitive responses can conflict with each other. "Good idea, but _____." The "but" in this case can relate to practical issues in pursuing the idea such as timing (why *now*?), location (why *here*?), or strategy

(why *this way*?), among others. These views can be quite constructive and lead to dialogue that addresses legitimate concerns about the change effort, hopefully improving its chance of success. Emotional ambivalence, on the other hand, can be much more complicated. Repatriation of an overseas unit to the continental U.S. can simultaneously produce relief ("going home") and sadness ("breaking relationship with the host town or country"). These competing emotions may be difficult for individuals to express.

F.2. Ambivalence as a Tool

Treating ambivalence and resistance the same, as obstacles to overcome, can have negative effects. Piderit warned that, "Moving too quickly toward congruent positive attitudes toward a proposed change might cut off the discussion and improvisation that may be necessary…"[90] Rather, she viewed ambivalence as a potential source of energy, as a way of allowing change agents to engage with and listen to members in the course of planning and implementing change. This is extremely important when considering change efforts in a very large organization with its many competing perspectives and potential interpretations of the impetus and strategy behind a change effort.

This contrasts from how communicating is discussed in *Leading Change*. Kotter presents three signs that demonstrate poor communication of a vision: (1) recipients do not feel the same urgency, (2) the guiding coalition is not the right group, and (3) a vision that does not resonate.[91] Unfortunately, in organizations as large as the U.S. military, these three conditions are givens.

- Natural tensions exist between the "Pentagon" and all the commands and staffs located outside of it, continental U.S.-based organizations and their overseas counterparts, organizations in combat or contingency operations and those back in garrison, conventional versus special forces, and many others. These competing perspectives often result in strongly differing views over the urgency and clarity of the vision statements, regardless of proponent.
- For joint or service-wide efforts, the proponent rarely has the opportunity to choose the guiding coalition. Rather, a representative body (e.g. council or working group), cobbled together from a large number of internal stakeholders, likely govern such efforts. While the leader may have a geographically close team who are strong believers in the change, the council or working group is apt to contain both true believers and those whose involvement constitutes a mere collateral duty; as such, membership is typically unreliable and unstable.
- A top-down decreed vision assures neither clarity nor sense of direction. When military scholars Peter Eide and Chuck Allen reviewed a half-century of unsuccessful attempts at acquisition reform noted that there was always a "nexus of agreement" to "execute weapons procurement more efficiently," but the official vision statement of "Acquisition excellence through leadership with integrity" offered no sense of what the reforms would look like.[92]

Purposeful two-way engagement,[93] leveraging ambivalence as a tool, is a beneficial way to use such situations to strengthen the change effort. Key are *listening* and *sustaining dialogue*, in forums as large as world-wide teleconference to those as intimate as one-on-one follow-up sessions. Acknowledging and empathizing with other perspectives helps marginalize the negative effects of ambivalence, and improves the chances of a wide and varied audience, such as the collective body of service members, accepting a change effort. These valuable tools also allow leaders to synthesize implementation plans acceptable to a greater part of the joint force. Too much top-down communication, particularly in a teleconference setting, can be off-putting and stifle dialogue, fostering a lack of interest or outright resistance to the effort.[94]

G. Swimming in a Sea of Change

Another shortcoming of Kotter's *Leading Change* is its focus on the reader's role in initiating the transformation effort as opposed to inheriting it. In the U.S. military, however, the majority of change efforts senior leaders encounter are already underway. Weapons systems programs, for example, last years or even decades from conception to final fielding, and stewardship of those programs may change hands every other year. Moreover, there are hundreds of such programs on-going at any time, many of which are interdependent of each other. New programs are not the only changes on-going, either. Consider the many other forces that drive change within the U.S. military -- base realignments and closures, military construction, research and publication of new doctrine, new training and education requirements, host nation support agreements, contingency operations (both combat and non-combat), diplomatic relations and military-to-military contacts (including foreign military sales and acquisition cross-service agreements). Although senior military leaders strive hard to harmonize all these efforts, it is not always possible.

G.1. Evaluating the Change Effort

Senior leaders inheriting a change effort should pursue a fundamental question early – should the effort continue? Leaders have several options from which to choose: (1) continue as is, (2) continue with modifications, (3) re-design the effort, (4) stop the effort, or (5) undo the effort. The latter two are not the same – 'stopping' calls for simply ceasing the expenditure of organizational energy and accepting new state of the organization, while 'undoing' means undertaking a second change effort to restore the original state. Although the leaders' assessment might not be feasible (e.g. powerful external stakeholders wanting to continue a change effort that the leader believes must be stopped), doing a proper assessment helps arm the leader with negotiating leverage to help bring a flagging effort back on track. This paper presents several key questions below for leaders to consider, along with generalized analytical concepts associated with each. None of these questions are easily answered. All are context-specific.

G.1.1. Has the Situation Changed?

The initial urgency that spurred the change effort may no longer hold, and the previous leaders may have invested so much into the effort they failed to recognize the situation has changed. Rarely is this easily discerned. If a program's primary purpose is to defeat a threat and the threat no longer exists, it does not automatically negate the program. The capability may still be required to defeat or deter other like threats. For leaders assessing the effort, the essential question is one of alignment. Is the change effort sufficiently aligned with the new situation such that the original urgency still holds? Or has it changed so much the effort will potentially produce ineffective or inefficient results?

Leaders must avoid the pitfall of harboring a preconceived notion that the effort is off-track prior to doing the analysis. A leader may not have agreed with the original sense of urgency or may be aware of changes in the environment leading to doubts about the effort's purpose or progress. It is important to consider the effort from the perspective of the previous steward. Other factors, such as those below, may have contributed to the current state of the effort.

G.1.2. What is the Relationship Between This Effort and Others?

The hundreds of change efforts on-going at any given time within the U.S. military are interdependent to varying degrees. Leaders must consider those interdependencies, which may appear as assumptions governing the implementation plan. The fielding of a new weapons system may depend on facility and installation decisions or technological readiness levels. The establishment of a new organization may depend on available military construction dollars or base realignment decisions. Human resource management policies often come into play, as change efforts involving people may run afoul of manpower decisions.

Any action to alter a change effort risks delaying it, which may affect other on-going change efforts. Of course, such interdependencies should not excuse the leader from making the hard decision to cancel an effort that is failing. However, understanding them allows the leader to make a better informed decision, as well as alert the stakeholders (internal or external) of the other change effort so they can plan/adjust accordingly.

G.1.3. What are the Obstacles, and Which are Most Critical?

There are numerous potential obstacles to progress, the question is which are deemed critical -- meaning sufficiently strong to prevent achievement of the effort's goals. This subsection presents a menu of areas to expect obstacles to appear. For most change efforts, there will be a few obstacles that, if left unaddressed, would bring about failure, whereas other obstacles might cause only delays or disruption. The criticality of an obstacle depends on the situation, but some of the common obstacles listed below might present strong candidates in a general case.

Large-scale change efforts rarely go as originally planned, particularly those that depend on *key external stakeholders, require technological advances, or face unstable environments*; changes in the US military often face all three. Most change efforts in the U.S. military, involve Congressional funding, inviting questions surrounding the efficacy or progress of a change effort that may present obstacles to its completion. As the US military strives to maintain its technological edge, lack of technological readiness, itself a subjective measure, can quickly bring programs to a halt. As with changes in the situation, the natural flux in the strategic environment can question the relevance, urgency, or priority of a change effort.

Clearly, *resistance and ambivalence* constitute potential obstacles, but leaders must avoid making too hasty a judgment as to how important these obstacles are. At one extreme, ambivalence can appear as 'having waited-out the previous leader,' whereby members avoid discussion about it or quietly discourage the leader from pursuing it. The predecessor may have had the effort at highest priority but failed to convince the organization of its merits, and the organization simply chose silence in the hope the incoming leader would allow the effort to perish.

On the other extreme, the incoming leader may receive strongly emotional and vocal opposition to the change effort and calls for its immediate termination. The clamor may be a pre-emptive strike to inhibit the incoming leader from conducting a proper review. Such might occur with change efforts that adversely affect benefits or services for service members, families, and civilians. In such cases, leaders might accommodate some concerns (particular in areas of safety or security) but should still hold out any major decisions until they performed the review.

In general, readers must avoid determining the criticality of resistance and ambivalence based solely on the emotions involved. It is more important to investigates the basis for resistance and ambivalence that represents the true obstacle at work. Is it misunderstanding or misperception? Are there factors the previous leader was ignoring, or areas of risk the leader was accepting? Was the previous leader under a mandate from external stakeholders (e.g., budget constraints or higher level guidance/directives). What were the assumptions underlying the effort regarding the impact on organizational members and do they still hold?

The governance mechanism, including pacing of the change effort, is another common source area for obstacles. Appropriate governance can enable the change effort, while ineffective governance will create obstacles to it. Organizations may react unfavorably to what it perceives as 'artificial' deadlines, including those set by leaders based solely on the expected duration of their tenures (which may bring about a desire to wait the leaders out). Leaders should ensure intermediate deadlines carry meaning or present possibilities for decision, and not constrain them to mundane data gathering and reporting. Leaders should also pay attention to how the communication campaign emphasizes the effort, as over-emphasis can create conditions of fatigue and ambivalence. Kotter would probably take issue with this point, as his observations are that change efforts tend to be undercommunicated. Our view is that leaders must vary their

communication emphasis after assessing whether the communications have achieved their purpose, or whether the organizational stakeholders have perceived them as random or disjointed with respect to the whole of the organization's activities.

A corollary to the governance issue regards the quality and timing of key implementing directives. One of the authors had a personal experience whereby a chief of staff signed the command's strategic plan as his last act prior to transferring authority. The incoming chief of staff immediately paid it no credence and starting the planning effort anew.

G.1.4. Are the Right Motors and Strategies in Use?

This is a challenging consideration as it is a subjective call. Leaders should never dismiss any of Van de Ven and Poole's motors or Chin and Benne's strategies. Although many large-scale U.S. military efforts will exercise the *life-cycle motor*, they may just as ably use other motors, even preferring alternative ones to achieve particular goals of the effort. Leaders should consider if one-size truly fits-all for that change effort, or whether they can exercise small-scale, innovative experiments to overcome obstacles during *post-launch*. In cases of controversial change efforts that pit two communities against one another, are leaders properly employing the *dialectic motor*? Or are they preferring one side over the other (thesis or antithesis) or not allowing a synthesized solution to come about? If so, does this mean that the current change effort goals are problematic? Alternatively, is the change effort exercising too much lower-level change (i.e., too much reliance on evolution), leading to disjointedness or redundancy?

Leaders should also align the strategies (rational-empirical, normative-reeducative, and power-coercive) with the organizational culture and the aims of the effort. For example, if the change effort is spurred by an internal crisis, one should expect the top leaders to include some power-coercive strategies to communicate and drive the needed changes. Is it working, or is it merely engendering resistance? Changes related to weapons-systems or organizational structures tend to rely heavily on data analysis, leading to rational-empirical approaches. Is the analysis convincing or is it contradicting experiences and lessons learned? If normative (therapeutic) or reeducative (training) approaches are in use to change organizational behavior or culture, is it effective? Moreover, should leaders replace one strategy with another? If normative actions are not having the desired effect fast enough, should the leader put his/her foot down (power-coercive)?

G.2. Deciding on the Change Effort

After evaluating the change effort, as described above, leaders should be able to determine the best and most logical future of the change effort. Undoubtedly, one would expect leaders inheriting change efforts from others would rarely continue them without making some changes. This should be encouraged, because *new leaders must establish ownership of the change effort, including making the decision to cancel it*. Establishing ownership will tend to include returning to Kotter's early step of articulating the sense of urgency, this time in the words of the new leader

(even if those words closely mirror those of the previous leader(s)). It also includes rebalancing the approaches used by the leader in executing the change. Leaders who merely carry on the effort without asserting ownership risk conveying to the organization that the change is not a priority or no longer urgent. This will almost assuredly give rise to increased ambivalence amongst the organizational stakeholders.

Cancelling a change effort is difficult, even when it is apparent the effort is neither achieving nor progressing toward its goals. If the organization has invested substantial energy into the change, cancelling risks appearing as a repudiation of that effort, and acting to further undo the change can magnify this effect. Leaders must determine what benefits to salvage from a failing change effort, and seek to build on those. The Army Transformation of the late 1990s, for example, was cancelled but new systems stemming from it were still successfully fielded.

Hence, the leader must weigh the costs against the benefits of continuing the effort. If the costs are too high, then further decision to undo must take into account whether the current state of the organization is viable, or does stopping the change mid-stream leave the organization in an untenable, non-functioning state? An example of this was the cancellation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) in the late 2000s and subsequent reversion to the previous General Schedule (GS) for managing civilian personnel. It was not possible to leave the two systems running concurrently, so cancelling NSPS entailed the need to revert all employees into the GS system. But because of the different pay structures, and the fact that NSPS effectively promoted several employees, undoing the new system required a second change to return the workforce under GS so NSPS employees did not unduly forfeit pay or status.

If a leader determines to continue the effort with modifications, they should consider how to accomplish the following: (1) assert ownership by re-stating to appropriate audiences the purpose, sense of urgency, and desired outcomes, (2) clearly state what will be modified, what will stay the same, and why, (3) ensure the modifications address the critical obstacles to success, and (4) clearly articulate (or re-state) how the modified effort will measure progress will be measured how the leader will govern the altered effort.

H. Conclusion

Nearly twenty years after its initial publication, audiences still laud Kotter's *Leading Change* continues for its simplicity and influence. According to the New York Times, it has sold more than a million copies,[95] and TIME Magazine placed it on the list of the 25 Most Influential Business Management Books as recently as January 2015.[96] However, as this primer shows, implementing Kotter's eight steps does not guarantee success for a change effort; this is particularly true in the U.S. military where leaders of change efforts do not necessarily enjoy the conditions one might assume from Kotter's approach. The size and complexity of the U.S. military organization and its strong dependence on external stakeholders such as Congress cause

leaders to employ strategies and actions that modify or even deviate from Kotter's preferences. Thus, while Kotter represents an important starting point for budding senior leaders looking for ways to implement change in the U.S. military, they should not consider it a complete, all-encompassing solution.

The purpose of this primer was to offer alternative perspectives to leading change in the U.S. military context. These included the use of different motors of change presented by Van de Ven and Poole and strategies according to Chin and Benne. It reviewed ways of identifying potential areas to fix through organizational diagnosis models such as Weisbord's six-box or Burke-Litwin's more elaborate model of performance and change. It also reviewed Piderit's take on resistance and ambivalence, that they were not merely obstacles to breach but necessary components of an organization's response to change and potential sources of energy. Finally, the primer discussed the roles of leaders when inheriting change efforts, which is arguably a more common scenario than that of initiating change. How do leaders analyze a change effort to determine whether it should continue or be cancelled? How do leaders enact those decisions?

Addressing a dynamic global security environment requires military organizations to balance meeting today's needs with tomorrow's challenges. The need for change is continuous, and serving as senior leaders implies a willingness to embrace, and even facilitate, change. But, change is hard and complex. In an organization with hundreds of major change efforts happening at once, it is often difficult to sort out which efforts are progressing, which are flagging, and which require modification or new change efforts entirely. This primer should help leaders navigate this challenging environment and make better decisions about organizational change.

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[1] This paper reflects solely the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense. Authors can be reached at USAWC-DCLM, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013 or Thomas.p.galvin.civ@mail.mil or lance.d.clark.mil@mail.mil.

[2] John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, 1st Ed. (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 1996).

[3] The senior service colleges include the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Fort McNair, Washington, DC; the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA; the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI; the Air War College in Maxwell AFB, AL; and the Marine War College in Quantico, VA.

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[5] Thomas P. Galvin, *A Phenomenological Study of Identity Construction among Military Officers Promoted from the Middle Ranks to the Roles of Senior Leaders*, Doctoral Dissertation (Washington, DC: The George Washington University, 2015), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1664831125?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=4444 (accessed 1 April 2015).

[6] See Leonard Wong, *Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), David A. Fastabend and Robert H. Simpson, "ADAPT OR DIE," *ARMY Magazine*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (February

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[7] John P. Kotter, *A Sense of Urgency* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

[8] Kotter's treatment of resistance is largely focused on identifying and overcoming "troublesome supervisors" who impede progress for self-serving reasons (see Kotter, *Leading Change*, 122-123).

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[11] Don M. Snider, "The U.S. Army as a Profession," in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd Ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 14.

[12] Ibid.

[13] William E. Turcotte, "Executive Strategy Issues for Very Large Organizations," in Richard I. Lester and A. Glenn Morton (Eds.) *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*, 4th ed. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 2001), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/turcotte.pdf (Retrieved 26 June 2015).

[14] Graham Beaver, "Small Firms: Owners and Enterpreneurs," *Strategic Change*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2003): 177-183.

[15] Larry P. Pleshko and Inge Nickerson, "Strategic Comparisons of Very Large Firms to Smaller Firms in a Financial Service Industry," *Academy of Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 6 (2007): 105.

[16] Turcotte, 159.

[17] Both Beaver and Pleshko & Nickerson, for example.

[18] John P. Kotter, *XLR8 (Accelerate)* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 20-22.

[19] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, Joint Publication 3-31 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014) and U.S. Army, *Mission Command*, Army Doctrinal Publication 6-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012).

[20] Kotter, *Leading Change,* 14 and 16.

[21] Eric Hoffer, *The Ordeal of Change* (Titusville, NJ: Hopewell, 1951), 3-6.

[22] Snider, "The U.S. Army as a Profession," 14.

[23] Fastabend & Simpson, 16, talked about the U.S. Army's addiction to "process" and specifically criticized the dampening effects on innovation of the current programming process within the Department of Defense's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system (PPBE).

[24] This is an inherent obstacle to any government or public sector change effort according to Frank Ostroff, "Change Management in Government," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (May 2006): 141-147, 158.

[25] U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2012), 2-3.

[26] Charles D. Allen and Willam G. Braun, "TRUST: Implications for the Army Profession," Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2013): 73-85.

[27] Sandy Kristin Piderit, "Rethinking Resistance and Recognizing Ambivalence: A Multidimensional View of Attitudes Toward an Organizational Change," *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (October 2000): 783-794. http://search.proquest.com/docview/210980597 (accessed 4 November 2014).

[28] Ostroff, 142.

[29] Joint professional military education standards illustrate this. In Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP),* CJCS Instruction CJCSI 1800.01E (Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, May 2015), the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) standards Level I ("JPME-I") for Intermediate-Level Colleges require officers, in the context of joint *operational* leadership to "*comprehend critical thinking and decisionmaking skills needed to anticipate* and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty" and "*analyze the importance* of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations" (p. E-C-3, emphasis added). JPME-II standards for Senior Service Colleges require officers, in the context of joint *strategic* leadership, to "*Evaluate the skills, including communication synchronization, needed to lead organizational change and transformation* and to build and sustain innovative, agile, and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment" and "*Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations* capable of operating in dynamic, complex and uncertain environments, anticipate change, and respond to surprise and uncertainty" (pp. E-D-3 and 4, emphasis added).

[30] Rob Hoskin and Sean Heritage, "The New Command Culture of Cooperative Leadership," *Proceedings*, Vol. 138, No. 7 (July 2012): 79-81; and Sean Heritage, "Workplace Culture: Google and the Military," Blog post, *SeanHeritage.com* (September 27, 2010), http://seanheritage.com/blog/workplace-culture-google-and-the-military/ (retrived 15 July 2015).

[31] Hoffer, 3-5.

[32] Chowdhury Hossan, "Applicability of Lewin's Change Management Theory in Australian Local Government," *International Journal of business and Management*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (June 2015): 53-65.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Graphic adapted from Ibid., 58, which originated in Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science* (New York: Harper & Row, 1951).

[35] William Bridges, *Managing Transitions: Making the Most of Change*, 1st Ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1991), 3.

[36] William Bridges and Susan Bridges, *Managing Transitions: Making the Most of Change*, 3rd Ed. (Boston, MA: DeCapo, 2009), 5.

[37] Bridges (1991), 37.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Andrew H. Van de Ven and Marshall S. Poole, "Explaining Development and Change in Organizations," *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1995): 510-540.

[40] The remainder of this subsection is drawn from Van de Ven and Poole, Section II, 519-525.

[41] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).

[42] Van de Ven & Poole, 520.

[43] Ibid., Section III, 526-532.

[44] Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Changes in Human Systems," in W. G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (Eds.), *The Planning of Change*, 4th Ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt), 22-45.

[45] Ibid., 23.

[46] See Marvin R. Weisbord, *Productive Workplaces Revisited: Dignity, Meaning, and Community in the 21st Century*, 2nd Ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004) for a detailed description of Taylorism and its impact on private enterprise throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries.

[47] Chin & Benne, 31.

[48] Chin & Benne, 40, specifically cited Gandhi's civil disobedience and strategy of nonviolence as an example.

[49] Thomas P. Galvin, "Assignment: Special Assistant to the Commander," *Military Review*, Vol. 95, No. 2 (March-April 2015): 33-38, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1660802032 (accessed 8 April 2015).

[50]Salvatore Falletta, *Organizational Diagnostic Models: A Review and Synthesis*, Human Resources Intelligence Report (Sacramento, CA: Leadersphere, 2008), 9. Also see Weisbord, 432.

[51] Marvin R. Weisbord, "Organizational Diagnosis: Six Places to Look for Trouble With or Without a Theory," *Group and Organizational Dynamics*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1976): 430-447.

[52] W. Warner Burke and George H. Litwin, "A Causal Model of Organizational Performance and Change," *Journal of Management*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1992): 523-545.

[53] Adapted from Ibid., 531.

[54] Ibid., 533.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Michael I. Harrison, "Hard Choices in Diagnosing Organizations," *Journal of Management Consulting*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1990): 13-21.

[57] For a more detailed discussion about ethical challenges facing consultants, see Gordon Lippitt and Ronald Lippitt, *The Consulting Process in Action* (San Diego, CA: University Associates, 1986), Chapter 5, "Ethical Dilemmas and Value Guidelines" (pp. 77-98).

[58] Harrison, 18.

[59] Harrison, 18.

[60] Lippitt & Lippitt, 97.

[61] Ian Hodder, "The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture," in N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd Ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000), 703-717.

[62] Burke & Litwin, 529-530.

[63] Adapted from Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, *Qualitarive Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*, 2nd Ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), Chapter 10, "Making Good Sense- Drawing and Verifying Conclusions, 245-287.

[64] Ibid., 246.

[65] Ibid., 252.

Galvin and Clark (FIRST EDITION, 16 July 2015)   Beyond Kotter's *Leading Change*

[66] Miles and Hubermann offer this as their tenth tactic. The others are not included as they are increasingly complex and go beyond the scope of this book.

[67] Kotter, *Leading Change*, 72.

[68] We were unsuccessful in tracing the origins of this phrase (it has been widely misattributed), but it was identified as a "Pentagon saying" in Thomas L. Friedman, *Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution--and How It Can Renew America* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2008). See Stephen Kotkin, "A Call to Action for Earth and Profit," *New York Times On-Line* (September 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07shelf.html?_r=0 (accessed 15 July 2015).

[69] Kotter, *Leading Change*, 72.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Charles D. Allen and Andrew A. Hill, *Vision*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle, PA: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 2014).

[72] Kotter, *Leading Change*, 73-74.

[73] Ibid., 72.

[74] Ibid., 72.

[75] Ibid., 75.

[76] Ibid., 75.

[77] The term 'elevator pitch' describes various business-type communications, such as how one describes one's companies or projects in the span of a standard elevator ride, 30 seconds to two minutes as in Aileen Pincus, "The Perfect (Elevator) Pitch," *Bloomberg Business Online* (June 18, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-06-18/the-perfect-elevator-pitchbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (accessed 16 July 2015). In U.S. military culture, the mythical elevator ride is often situated in the Pentagon with a very senior military (e.g., service chief or Chairman) or civilian leader (e.g., Secretary of Defense) who spies the staff officer and asks, "What's on your mind?"

[78] See William E. "Kip" Ward, "Strategic Communication at Work," *Leader to Leader*, no. 59 (Winter 2011): 33-38 for more details on how U.S. Africa Command developed its initial identity during the 2007-2009 timeframe.

[79] U.S. Africa Command, for example, was initially formed under what was called an 'F-staff' structure in which the divisions of labor significant differed from those used in other joint commands. It included an Outreach Directorate, which had never previously existed, and combined other functions together in novel ways. However, this experiment ultimately proved inefficient, and after a few years the headquarters was quietly reorganized into a traditional joint staff structure.

[80] W. Warner Burke, *Organization Change: Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), 279-283.

[81] This is based on the idea of positional negotiations, in which the result is the 'mid-point' between two negotiating parties, and typically reflects the interests of the parties and not the interests of all stakeholders. For more, see Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), Chapter 1: "Don't Bargain Over Positions"; and George J. Woods, *Some Terminology and Definitions Used in 'Negotiating' Circles*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2007).

[82] U.S. Department of Defense, *Technological Readiness Assessment (TRA) Guidance* (Washington, DC: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)), 2011),

http://www.acq.osd.mil/chieftechnologist/publications/docs/TRA2011.pdf (retrieved 2 July 2015). See chart on page 2-13 for the current definitions of the nine technological readiness levels.

[83] This definition of 'validity' reflects *face validity*, which is one of several forms of validity used in empirical research (the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this primer). Readers are encouraged to familiarize themselves with concepts of validity and trustworthiness of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Countless quantitative and qualitative research publications present these concepts. (One available at the U.S. Army War College is Earl R. Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, 12th Ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage, 2010)).

[84] Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is often used to describe when a new or transformed organization has achieved a minimally acceptable level of capacity to assume the organization's mission. We wish to stress that deciding what IOC means would be a *pre-launch* or *launch* decision, but achieving IOC is very clearly *post-launch.*

[85] Simplified view of Kotter, *Leading Change*, 102.

[86] Ibid., 112-113.

[87] Chris Argyris, "How We Deal with Difficult Situations," in *Organizational Traps: Leadership, Cultural, Organizational Design* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 11-24.

[88] Tony J. Watson, "Group Ideologies and Organizational Change," *Journal of Management Studies*, Vol. 19, no. 3 (1982): 259-275.

[89] Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, "Ambivalence," (n.d.), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ambivalence (accessed 10 July 2015).

[90] Piderit, 790.

[91] Kotter, *Leading Change*, 86.

[92] Peter K. Eide and Charles D. Allen, "The More Things Change, Acquisition Reform Remains the Same," *Defense AR Journal,* Vol. 19, No. 1 (January 2012): 99-120.

[93] We prefer this term to 'socialization' which is common in the U.S. Army. Socialization seems to imply more push than pull, in that the purpose is to inform others of a *fait accompli* solution rather than construct a mutually-agreeable one.

[94] One of the authors can count on both hands the number of times that, during a teleconference, the proponent of a local change effort declared that it was to become a *de facto* Army standard because a general said so (the term 'best practice' is often invoked). Invariably, the teleconference responds very negatively. Conversely, when the proponent offers successes for wider application (e.g., Kotter's 'short-term win') and shows a willingness to listen to feedback, the council or working group tends to be more receptive.

[95] Angel Jennings, "Book Brings Penguins to Boardrooms," *New York Times* (July 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/business/media/16penguin.html (retrieved 23 June 2015).

[96] TIME Magazine, *The 25 Most Influential Business Management Books, TIME On-Line* (n.d.), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,2086680,00.html (retrieved 23 June 2015).